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ABSTRACT

Students of government finance have ignored to a sur
prising extent the savings bond program as an instrument of
debt management in the postwar period.

The hypothesis here

considered is that the role of this program in debt manage
ment for calendar years 1947-63 depended largely upon the
responsiveness of the demand for savings bonds to interest
rate differentials between these bonds and alternative out
lets for savings and the unwillingness and/or inability of the
Treasury to maintain the attractiveness of savings bond
yields.
Accordingly, the investigation was directed first to
isolating those major variables affecting the demand for
savings bonds; second, to establishing the apparent extent
to which the attractiveness of savings

bonds depended

upon relative yields; third, to indicating (quantitatively)
both the responses of investors to Treasury offerings of
savings bonds and the importance of savings bonds as a
component of the national debt; and fourth, to testing of
those variables affecting the demand for savings bonds for
significance.

For series of savings bonds which were primarily de
signed and sold to individuals with small financial means,
the tests indicate that a few yield differentials between
savings bonds and marketable government securities are sig
nificant single determinants of the combined net sales of
these series during calendar years 1947-63.

For series of

savings bonds which were designed and sold to nonindividual
and individual investors with substantial financial means,
the tests indicate that income and several yield differen
tials between savings bonds and both marketable government
securities and savings deposits (or shares) In financial
intermediaries are significant multiple determinants of the
combined net sales of these series.

In essence, these re

sults indicate that the sensitivity of investors to changes
in relative yields (1) was greater for investors with large
financial means than for investors with small means, and (2)
was greater than that for changes in income.
It was also found that the Treasury was generally un
willing to maintain the attractiveness of the relative yields
of savings bonds designed for investors with large means.
The greater interest-rate sensitivity of these investors
tends to point out the Treasury's rationale for discontinuing
the sales of these series of bonds early in 1957.

The

restraint applied in maintaining the attractiveness of the
xi

relative yields of those"series designed for investors with
small means, on the other hand, originated more often from
a prohibitive, statutory interest rate ceiling.

For example,

in addition to increasing the maturity yields on new issues
of these series in 1952 and 1957, the Treasury even increased
the maturity yields on new and outstanding issues in 1959;
with respect to the latter yield boost, however, more un
willingness rather than inability limited the increase in
yields on new and outstanding issues.
This study, however, appears to raise more questions
than it answers.

First, the results of the tests of sig

nificance of those variables affecting the demand for sav
ings bonds are promising for a preliminary study, but they
are not conclusive.

Second, an appropriate role for the

savings bonds program in debt management has not yet been
defined clearly in the literature.

xii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The savings bond program In the United States has been
an important instrument of Federal debt management from its
inception on March 1, 1935 to the present time.

Although

the primary concern of this study is the significance of
savings bonds in postwar debt management (1947-63), a review
of the earlier history of the program is also presented in
order to provide necessary background information.
During the life-span of the program--approximately
twenty-nine years by the end of calendar

year 1963--the

Treasury sold ten alphabetical series of savings bonds,
beginning with the original series A and ending with series
K bonds.

All series of savings bonds were identical

Only bonds of series A through D were sold between
March, 1935 and April, 1941. As a substitute for these
original offerings of a single series of savings bonds,
bonds of series E, F, and G were introduced in May, 1941.
Bonds of series J and K, respectively, were substituted
for the offerings of bonds of series F and G beginning in
May, 1952.
In June, 1952, series H bonds were introduced.
After the sales of series J and K bonds were discontinued
in April, 1957, only bonds of series E and H were sold.

1

2

with respect to two features--all were registered and nonmarketable.

In spite of the differences in the terms on

which they could be redeemed for cash, all savings bonds
were highly liquid assets.

All bonds could be redeemed

virtually at any time at the discretion of the holder,
and all could be converted into cash with zero risk of
capital loss.

The great liquidity of savings bonds

depended partly on their fixed yield structure, i.e.,
the stated and unvarying terms on which -they could be
redeemed for cash at various times up to and past origi
nal maturity date.
In attempting to sell nonmarketable savings bonds,
the Treasury is faced with the following dilemma.

In an

environment in which interest rates are relatively stable,
a fixed yield structure on savings bonds might enable the
Treasury to both attract a large number of long-term lenders
and inhibit redemptions of outstanding bonds prior to m a 
turity, but the cost to the Treasury could be quite high.
The reason for this, of course, is that the Treasury must
fix the yield structure on its savings bonds at a level
sufficiently high to insure the attractiveness of these
securities vis-l-vis competing outlets for funds.

In

general, the Treasury cannot ignore its financing costs
and is under pressure to minimize them.

Even worse, when

3

economic conditions are relatively unstable, frequent
changes in yields on savings bonds are required if the
Treasury is to attract long-term lenders and inhibit early
redemptions.

Yet, the frequency of changes in yields on non-

marketable securities are clearly limited by institutional
restraints.
The environment in which the savings bond program
operated and the unwillingness and/or the inability of the
Treasury to maintain the attractiveness of the yield
structures on these issues largely determined the role of
savings bonds in Treasury borrowing.

Since its inception,

the savings bond program has not functioned within a uni
form environment.

Significant changes in the core of the

program, especially with respect to changes in yield struc
tures, have occurred in response to major environmental
changes.

In this respect, a minimum of three periods

within the life-span of the program can be distinguished.
These periods are identified in this study as a period of
origin (March 1, 1935 to April 30, 1941), an expansionary
period (May 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946), and a postwar
period (calendar years 1947-63).

However, a division in

the postwar period appears to have occurred sometime be
tween the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950
and the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord on March 4, 1951.

4
Consequently,

the postwar period is divided into two phases,

the first stopping at the end of calendar year 1950.
Between the inception of the savings bond program and
the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord early in 1951, frequent
changes in yield structures for new issues of savings bonds
were unnecessary.

The economy was characterized by rela-

tively stable rates of interest on alternative investments.
The existing yield structure on savings bonds--designed so
as to provide a higher or "premium" yield on savings bonds
held to maturity and lower "penalty" rates (relative to the
maturity yield) on bonds redeemed prior to maturity--was
effective in attracting long-term lenders and inhibiting
early redemptions.

2

The relative attractiveness of savings

Actually, some modest fluctuations in rates on alter
native investments did occur, but not nearly of the magni
tude of post-accord rate movements.
Generally low but
mildly declining rates of interest on alternative invest
ments existed during the period of origin; therefore, the
relative attractiveness of savings bond yields progressively
increased during this period of time.
When the monetary
authorities adopted the policy of supporting the government
securities market at par during the Second World War, gen
erally low and rigidly stable rates of interest existed
on alternative investments.
This situation existed through
out the expansionary period.
With the continued, but less
rigid, support of the government securities market until the
accord in 1951, some slightly rising rates of interest on
alternative short-term investments were experienced during
the first phase of the postwar period.
To a small extent,
therefore, the relative attractiveness of savings bonds
deteriorated in this period, but only to a mild degree.

5

bond yields undoubtedly contributed to the acceptance of
these issues by investors, but the impetus

of patriotism

must be given considerable credit for the great expansion
in savings bonds during the Second World War.

Throughout

the period cited, but especially during the war, the savings
bond program expanded into an important source of net cash
receipts for the Treasury, and thereby allowed it to place
greater reliance on savings bonds in financing budgetary
deficits.
In the period of origin, the savings bond program pro
vided the Treasury with $3,489 million of net cash receipts
as savings bond holdings expanded to $3,647 million by the
end of the period.

The rapid rise in savings bond holdings

to $49,776 million by the end of the expansionary period
provided the Treasury with $44,529 million of net cash re
ceipts.

The Treasury also received $4,685 million during

the first phase of the postwar period, as savings bond
holdings expanded to $58,019 million by the end of 1950.
At this time also, the relative importance of savings bonds
in Treasury debt management reached its summit, as such
securities represented 22.6 per cent of the total debt.
After the accord, the economic environment changed to
one of generally rising, but flexible yields on alternative
investments.

In response to these developments, the

6

Treasury raised the structure of yields on certain series of
savings bonds on three occasions--1952, 1957, and 1959.
These boosts, however, were not of a sufficient magnitude
and reflected the Inability and/or unwillingness of tl^e
Treasury to adapt sufficiently to the changing condition^
In spite of these changes In yields, the savings bond pro
gram resulted in annual net cash drains for the Treasury fro
the accord to the end of 1963.
Outstanding savings bonds declined to $48,827 million
by the end of 1963, and the Treasury experienced a cumulative
net cash drain of $25,602 million from 1951 to 1963.

As a

percentage of the national debt, holdings of savings bonds
declined (from 22.6 per catt) to 15.8 per cent.

Not only

was this lack of success significant in itself, but un
doubtedly broader monetary and debt management policies
were adversely affected by these developments in the sav
ings bond program.

Objectives of the Study
The significance of the savings bond program in debt
management during the postwar period is the primary concern
of this study.

In particular, an attempt is made to iso

late those major variables affecting the demand for savings
bonds.

For a given time period, the role of savings bonds

7

may be evaluated relative to that in a prior period.

To

some extent, of course, this approach is utilized in this
study.

On the other hand, any evaluation of the program for

a given time period appears to hinge primarily upon the sig
nificance of savings bonds in total saving and in the alloca
tion of savings.

In this respect, the significance of sav

ings bonds, particularly during the postwar period, appears
to depend upon the responsiveness of investors to interest
rate differentials between savings bonds and alternative
outlets for savings.

Although the significance of savings

bonds in total saving and in the allocation of savings lies
generally beyond the scope of this study, the extent to
which investors were responsive to interest rate differen
tials is emphasized in evaluating the role of the program
during the postwar period.
In order to place the postwar situation in proper per
spective, the earlier history of the program and its objec
tives are presented first.

The savings bond program during

its lifetime is reviewed with respect to both the extent to
which the attractiveness of savings bonds depended upon
relative yields (Chapter II) and the responsiveness of
investors to savings bonds (Chapter III).

The detailed

coverage is greater for the postwar period, however.

8

Predominantly with respect to specific interest rate
differentials, the attractiveness of savings bonds from the
investors' point of view is then utilized in transforming
the orthodox demand for a good into the demand for savings
bonds (Chapter IV).

Perhaps most significant, empirical

estimates of the demand for savings bonds are then made for
the postwar period (Chapter V).

Finally, the role of the

savings bond program in Treasury debt management is evalu
ated in the concluding chapter.

Methodology of the Study
Each period identified within the life-span of the sav
ings bond program is considered to be a savings bond "mar
ket."

Since savings bonds are nonmarketable securities,

the "market" is necessarily an unorthodox one.
is the Treasury.

The seller

The buyers are private investors, but in

the case of savings bonds, eligible purchasers are speci
fied by the Treasury and certain exclusions are made.

No

secondary market for savings bonds exists as ownership of
the securities cannot be transferred.

However, savings

bonds are redeemable for cash, with only minor restrictions,
at either the Treasury or authorized outlets.
In general, the activity in this "market" reflects
the interaction between the Treasury and investors.

The

9

actions of the Treasury during a specified time period
represent, in part, its response to the acceptance of sav
ings bonds by investors in previous time periods.

In

vestors, on the other hand, respond to the Treasury's offer
based on the current attractiveness of savings bonds vis-ivis alternative investments.
In an orthodox market, the demand for a good per unit
of time depends upon its price, prices of substitutes and/or
complements, income, expectations, and tastes or prefer
ences.

It appears that a similar concept of demand can be

formulated for savings bonds if the time element for the
orthodox market is transformed into a time series and the
orthodox determinants are transformed into appropriate
determinants for savings bonds.

3

In adapting financial assets to this framework, proxy
independent variables must be substituted for the orthodox
determinants, especially the price determinants.

Prices as

opportunity costs, however, appear to provide the appropriate
substitutes.

In particular, interest rate differentials

seem appropriate for this purpose.

A similar approach was used by Richard T. Selden in
an empirical analysis of the demand for money.
See Richard
T. Selden, "Monetary Velocity in the United States," Studies
in the Quantity Theory of Money. ed. Milton Friedman (Chi
cago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 179-257.

10

In this study, the concept of the demand for savings
bonds is adopted.

Moreover, estimates of the demand for

savings bonds are derived empirically with the tool of
regression analysis.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF THE SAVINGS BOND PROGRAM:

TERMS

OF OFFERINGS AND ATTRACTIVENESS TO INVESTORS,
MARCH I, 1935 TO DECEMBER 31, 1963

The history of the savings bond program reflects both
the actions of the Treasury and the responses of investors.
In part, changes in the program from one time period to the
next represent the responses of the Treasury in the current
period to the acceptance of savings bonds by investors in
the previous period.

In reviewing the program during its

lifetime, therefore, the interaction between the Treasury
and investors is emphasized.
The Treasury's activities in each time period are re
flected primarily by the terms on which savings bonds were
offered, but also by the objectives of the program as stated
by Treasury officials.

The responses of the investors, of

course, are reflected solely by the figures for gross sales,
redemptions, net sales, and changes in outstanding bonds.
Essentially, the dual aspects of the Treasury's activities
are utilized in dividing the history of the program into
two chapters.
11

12

A history of the terms on which savings bonds were of
fered by the Treasury is presented in this chapter, and the
objectives of the program, as stated by Treasury officials,
are presented in Chapter III.

The interaction between the

Treasury and investors is emphasized throughout.

In this

chapter, the probable attractiveness of savings bonds to
investors and the terms of the Treasury's offerings are dis
cussed concurrently;

in the following chapter, the objec

tives of the program accompany the actual responses of
investors in terms of gross sales, redemptions, etc.

Period of Origin. March _1, 1935 to April 3 0 . 1941
During the period of origin the Treasury offered four
alphabetical series of savings bonds, beginning with series
A and ending with series D.^

All series were virtually

identical, other than in alphabetical designation,

2

and

can conveniently be discussed as a unit.

Bonds of series A were sold only during calendar year
1935; in 1936 only, bonds of series B were sold.
Series C
bonds were sold for two years, 1937 and 1938.
For the re
mainder of the period, only bonds of series D were sold.
«

2

When series D bonds were introduced, their features
other than alphabetical designation were identical to
those of series A, B, and C. Beginning April 1, 1940, how
ever, eligible D bond purchasers were restricted to natural
persons, namely, individuals; in addition, interest earned
on D bonds purchased on or after March 1, 1941 was no longer
granted preferential treatment for Federal income tax pur
poses.

13

Each, bond in series A-D was a discount-appreciation
type of government security which was sold at an issue price
equal to 75 per cent of its maturity value.

Interest, gradu

ated upward semiannually, appreciated the issue price of
each bond during its term to maturity.

Each bond matured

ten years after the first day of the month in which it was
purchased.

If held to its maturity date, a savings bond

which was purchased on the first day of a month would appre
ciate in value at the average rate of 2.90 per cent interest
3
per annum compounded semiannually.
Series A-D bonds were both
registered and nonmarketable.

The former feature provided pur

chasers protection from financial loss in case of theft, loss,
or destruction; the latter, from market depreciation of value.

Since all bonds purchased during a calendar month
were dated as though they had been purchased on the first
day of the month, savings bonds which were purchased after
the first of the month would appreciate in value at an aver
age rate somewhat in excess of 2.90 per cent.
^These features were adopted in order to avoid problems
similar to those associated with the Liberty bonds of the
First World War.
At that time, individuals were urged to
purchase Liberty bonds.
These bonds, however, were unreg
istered and marketable.
Small and/or unsophisticated in
vestors soon acquired a dislike for savings bonds possessing
these features.
As negotiable bonds, the Liberty bonds were
subject to the laws of negotiable instruments, and as mar
ketable bonds, they were subject to the law of supply and
demand.
As a result, many small and/or unsophisticated
investors, who had purchased Liberty bonds mainly for
patriotic reasons, suffered unexpected financial losses due
to either the laws of negotiable instruments or the law of
supply and demand.

4
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Series A-D bonds were redeemable £or cash prior to
maturity at redemption values less than the stated maturity
value.

Redemption prior to maturity, however, was permitted

only after a lapse of sixty days following the first day of
the month in which the bond was purchased.^

These redemp

tion values were known in advance by the owner since they
were published in a schedule attached to each bond.

Pre

arranged redemption values less than the stated maturity
value, of course, are synonymous with prearranged yields
less than the stated maturity yield.

6

—

/Tables A-l, A-2,

Since all savings bonds purchased during a month car
ried the issue date of the first day of that month, savings
bonds purchased on the last day of any month were redeemable
roughly one month from the date of purchase.
^Attached to each savings bond was a table including:
(1) a schedule of redemption values at successive (cumu
lative) half-year, time-holding-periods after the issue date;
(2) a schedule of yields to be realized if redemption oc
curred at successive (cumulative) half-year, time-holdingperiods after the issue date; and (3) a schedule of prospec
tive yields to maturity if the bond were held to maturity
rather than redeemed prior to maturity at successive (cumu
lative) half-year, time-holding-periods after the issue date.
A prospective yield to maturity is not a return that
the holder of a savings bond actually receives.
Rather,
this yield provides information that the holder may use in
deciding whether to redeem or continue to hold the bond to
maturity.
For example, if the prospective yield to maturity
exceeds an anticipated yield on a comparable investment, the
rational decision is to continue to hold the savings bond to
its maturity date.
If the anticipated yield on the alterna
tive investment is greater, the rational decision is to re
deem the savings bond in order to acquire the alternative
asset for a period of time equal to that required for the
savings bond to reach maturity.
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and A - 3 in Appendix A contain the schedules of redemption
values and yields on a $100 (maturity value) bond^/7
In order to attract a wide range of purchasers, series
A-D bonds were offered for sale in denominations of $25,
$50, $100, $500, and $1,000 in maturity value.

All types

of investors were considered eligible purchasers.

A limit

of $10,000 (maturity value) in bond purchases during a cal
endar year was imposed on all purchasers in order to promote
a widespread distribution of the ownership of the public
debt.

Interest earned on each bond was made partially tax-

exempt for Federal income tax purposes.
The offering of savings bonds by the Treasury provided
investors an alternative financial asset to consider in
planning their portfolios.

The attractiveness of savings

bonds relative to other assets certainly would vary among
investors.

In evaluating the relative attractiveness of

savings bonds, however, sophisticated investors probably
would consider the features of safety, liquidity, and exg
pected yield for a given time-holding-period.

^Henry Murphy, The National Debt In War And Transition
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 35-36.
Q
More technically, it appears reasonable that several
yields for different time-holding-periods would be con
sidered in order to allow for contingencies.
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Savings bonds were virtually riskless investments
since they were devoid of market risks as nonmarketable
securities, were exposed to minimum credit risks as obliga
tions of the United States government, and were isolated
from financial losses as registered bonds.

When compared

to alternative investments, series A-D bonds were rela
tively attractive in providing Investors a safe outlet for
savings.

The relative safety of savings bonds contributed

greatly to their attractiveness in a period characterized
by a general shift to savings media of unquestioned safety
in reaction to the financial crisis of the early 1930's.
The other feature of savings bonds, especially yield struc
ture, also contributed to their attractiveness.
The schedule of yields for savings bonds to a large
extent reflected the pattern of interest rates in the finan
cial markets.

The maturity yield of 2.90 per cent, however,

placed series A-D bonds in a preferred position relative to
marketable government securities and near moneys offered by
financial intermediaries.

In fact, for long-term lenders

With a ten-year term to maturity for newly issued
savings bonds, the use of long-term implies at least ten
years; on the other hand, short-term refers to any period
of time less than ten years.

9
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the maturity yield of savings bonds provided a "premium,"
which became progressively larger during the period of
origin as rates declined on competitive investments.
Table A-4 in Appendix A.)

(See

If savings bonds were redeemed

prior to maturity, on the other hand, short-term yields did
not place savings bonds in the same preferred position they
held on the basis of the maturity yield.

In order to attract

long-term lenders and inhibit early redemptions, the differ
entials between short-term yields on savingp bonds and yields
on alternative investments were smaller than the "premium"
of the maturity yield on savings bonds.

Similar to the case

for the maturity yield, however, the "premium" on short-term
yields of series A-D bonds became progressively larger dur
ing the period as rates on alternative investments declined.
(See Table A - 2 in Appendix A for the schedule of yields for
series A-D bonds; rates of interest on alternative invest
ments are contained in Table A-4 in Appendix A.)
For long-term lenders who were attracted to series A-D
bonds by the "premium" of the maturity yield, early redemp
tions probably were discouraged by redemption yields less
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than the stated maturity y i e l d . ^

If savings bonds were

purchased on the basis of their yields relative to alternative investments, the lower yields that savings bonds of
fered short-term lenders probably discouraged early redemp
tions to a smaller d e g r e e . ^
Relative to certain near moneys offered by financial
intermediaries and to marketable government securities,
series A-D bonds were less liquid in at least one respect.
The restriction on early redemption reduced the liquidity of
savings bonds slightly in comparison with these alternative
investments.

In general, alternative investments did not

contain a prohibition against conversion
time.

into cash at any

On the other hand, savings bonds met all the other

qualifications of an extremely liquid asset, as mentioned
earlier.

Alternatively, early redemption probably was dis
couraged by the high prospective yields to maturity for
savings bonds at short time-holding-periods after the
issue date.
That is, yield-sensitive long-term lenders
were locked-in.
See Table A-3 in Appendix A for the
schedule of prospective yields for series A-D bonds.
^*-If short-term lenders were yield insensitive in
purchasing savings bonds, early redemption likewise would
be insensitive to prospective yields to maturity.
Even for
yield sensitive short-term lenders, the prospective savings
bond yields to various future dates prior to the date of
maturity would be less prohibitive than prospective bond
yields to maturity.
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In summary, series A-D bonds contained many attractive
features in comparison with alternative investments.

Safety

of principal and relatively high yields contributed greatly
to the attractiveness of the bonds.

Falling yields on al

ternative investments during the period progressively in
creased the attractiveness of savings bonds.

The general

acceptance of savings bonds by investors during these early
years undoubtedly influenced the Treasury's decision to
greatly expand the program in the war years.

The Expansionary Period, May 1., 1941 to December 3 1 , 1946
The Treasury expanded the scope of the savings bond pro
gram early in 1941.

Its new offerings of savings bonds re

flected a basic change in the conception of the program.
As a substitute for the original sale of a single series of
bonds, the offering of a basket of savings bonds signified
the Treasury's attempt to tap wider sources of funds by
tailoring its issues more closely to the needs or prefer
ences of investors.
The first offering of multiple series of savings bonds
served as a substitute for the single offering of series D
bonds.

The new offering provided for the sale of:

(1)

savings stamps to children and individuals with extremely

limited financial resources;

(2) series E bonds to indi

viduals with small financial resources, but in limited
amounts to individuals with larger financial resources; and
(3) series F and G bonds in greater but limited amounts to
all investors outside the commercial banking system.

As

was their predecessor, all three series were nonmarketable
and registered securities.
The E bond offering provided the Treasury with a rela
tively expensive means of attracting long-term funds from a
difficult source--individuals with small financial resources.
With a somewhat restrictive limitation imposed on E bond
purchases, the offering of series F and G bonds at lower
yields provided the Treasury with a less expensive means of
borrowing additional funds from individuals with larger
financial resources,

This simultaneous offering of F and

G bonds to all investors outside the commercial banking sys
tem provided a broader means, with no change in cost to the
Treasury, of tapping additional funds.
The new E bonds emerged as series D bonds revised in

As savings stamps were never a significant source
of funds and are outside the scope of this study, no further
attention is directed to them.
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only two features.

13

Sharply reduced short-term and inter

mediate- term redemption values and yields were adopted for
the new E bonds, and the annual limit on bond purchases was
reduced.
The schedule of yields for E bonds was designed pri
marily to discourage early redemption, but possibly also,
to bring the short- and intermediate-term structure of inter
est rates more in line with the pattern of interest rates
that was developing in the financial markets.
A-4 in Appendix A.)

(See Table

In comparison to the old D bonds, the

yield structure on E bonds was sharply reduced for securi
ties held less than seven years.

For time-holding-periods

of seven years and more, however,

the yield structures for

E and D bonds were identical.
A-3 in Appendix A.)

(See Tables A-l, A-2, and

In adopting this schedule of yields

for E bonds, the Treasury narrowed the relative benefits
in short- and intermediate-term yields on savings bonds
compared to alternative investments and enlarged the
"penalties" for redeeming savings bonds prior to maturity.

13

The original offering of E bonds in denominations of
$25, $50, $100, $500, and $1,000 (maturity value) was iden
tical to the D bond offering.
Later in the period, however,
offerings of E bonds were expanded; from June, 1941 to March,
1950, a $10 bond was sold to armed forces personnel and
beginning in October, 1945, a $200 E bond was offered for
sale.
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Thus, it appears that E bonds were designed primarily to
attract long-term lenders who were sensitive to interest
rates; undoubtedly, the Treasury assumed that short-term
lenders were yield sensitive also.
Since the substantial "premium" in maturity yield which
existed for series D bonds was established for the new E
bonds, the calendar year limit on purchases was reduced
from $10,000 (maturity value)
bonds.

in D bonds to $5,000 in E

In essence, the lower limit reduced the extent to

which the "premium" in maturity yield was to be paid to
individuals with large financial resources.
In order to tap additional funds from all investors
outside the commercial banking system, the Treasury designed
two new series of savings bonds:

a discount-appreciation

bond, series F; and a current-income bond, series G.

Bonds

of both series had a term to maturity of twelve years, be
ginning the first day of the month in which they were pur
chased.

Graduatedupward semiannually,

interest appreciated

the purchase price of the F bonds; the G bonds, on the other
hand, provided uniform interest payments semiannually.

The

purchase price of F bonds was 74 per cent of their maturity
value.

If held to maturity, these securities appreciated in

value at a rate equivalent to 2.53 per cent interest.

The

G bonds, on the other hand, were purchased at par value.

If
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held to maturity, current interest payments yielded 2.50
per cent per annum, a figure virtually identical to that on
the F bonds.
Sales of both F and G bonds were limited to $50,000
(issue price) during any calendar

year; all investors other

than commercial banks were eligible to purchase these securities.

1A

These bonds originally were offered in denomi

nations of $100, $500, $1,000, and $10,000 (par value);
sale of $25 F bonds was later authorized.
The condit ions for redeeming F and G bonds were identi
cal, but were more rigid than that for E bonds.

It is to

be recalled that E bonds were redeemable for cash sixty
days after issue and without advance notice.

By comparison,

F and G bonds were not redeemable until six months after the
first day of the month in which they were purchased, and were
redeemable only upon advance notice of sixty days.

These

features rendered F and G bonds somewhat less liquid than
series E bonds.
Similar to E bonds, early redemption values for F bonds
were less than the stated maturity value;

1A

for G bonds,

It is interesting to note that while F and G bonds
were normally limited to nonbank purchasers, limited amounts
of these bonds were purchased by commercial banks in special
offerings in 19AA and 19A5.
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redemption values prior to maturity were discounted par
values.

The various penalties for early redemptions were

similar for series F and G bonds, but were more severe than
those imposed on comparable early redemptions of E bonds.
The level of the schedule of yields (redemption values) for
F bonds was virtually the same as that for G bonds; however,
their yields and redemption values were lower than those for
E bonds.

(See Table A-l and A-2 in Appendix A.)

Of particular importance, the yield structure adopted
for F and G bonds was less attractive than that for E bonds
when compared to yields on competitive investments.

This

differential in relative yields reflected the Treasury's
attempt to segregate individuals with small financial re
sources and reward them at a higher rate than others.

The

generous yields established for E bonds was one of the means
by which the Treasury hoped to achieve its objective of pro
moting a widespread ownership of the public debt.

One con

sequence of this differentiation was that the less attrac
tive yields established for F and G bonds rendered them more
vulnerable to small increases in the level of interest rates
on competitive investments.

This was not very significant

during the war period, however, because of the TreasuryFederal Reserve's decision to support the prices of market
able government securities at par.

As a result, rates of
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interest on investments competitive with savings bonds were
effectively stabilized.

The Postwar Period, Calendar Years 1947-63
A division in the postwar period appears to have oc
curred sometime between the outbreak of the Korean War in
the summer of 1950 and the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord
on March 4, 1951.

In this respect, a division of this period

into two phases may be appropriate, with the end of calendar
year 1950 marking the division.
During the first phase of the postwar period the
Treasury continued to offer the same basket of savings bonds
that was offered during the war.

Minor differences con

sisted of special offerings and a doubling of the annual
limits on purchases of E, F, and G b o n d s . ^
Some relevant yields for the entire postwar period
are depicted in Chart 2-1.

Various concepts of the returns

on savings bonds are shown as are the yields on marketable

^S i mi lar
to those special offerings in 1944 and 1945,
commercial banks were permitted to purchase limited amounts
of F and G bonds in the special offerings of 1948 and 1950.
Effective March 18, 1948, the annual limit on E bond pur
chases was increased from $5,000 to $10,000 in maturity
value; for F and G bonds, the limit was raised to $100,000,
but between July 1, 1948 and July 15, 1948, to $1,000,000
for institutional investors.
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Sources and Notes to Chart 2-1
Sources:
Yields on new issues of savings bonds for all
years prior to the change in yields in 1959 from Treasury
Bulletin (May, 1959), p. A-8; for the 1959 change in yields
and the yields for the years thereafter, ibid. (October,
1959), p. A-4.
Effective rates of return paid to share
holders in savings and loan associations for the years
1946-1959 from Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in
the United States (Princeton, N. J . , 1955), Vol. 1, p. 447;
effective rates of return paid to shareholders in member
savings and loan associations of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System for years 1950-1953 from Federal Home Loan Board,
Combined Financial Statements 1953, p. 8; for years 1954-63
from ibid, 19&3. p. 9. Effective rates of return paid to
deposit holders in insured mutual savings banks for years
1946-50 from Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation 1950, pp. 274-275; for the years 1951-54, ibid.
1959. pp. 168-169; for years 1955-63; ibid. 1963. pp. 176177.
Effective rates of return paid to time and savings
deposit holders in insured commercial banks for years 194650, ibid. 1950. pp. 252-253; for years 1951-54, ibid. 1959,
pp. 146-147; for years 1955-63, ibid. 1963. pp. 154-155.
Effective rates of return for Federal- and State-chartered
credit unions are calculated yields from dividend payments
and share data; for the year 1947 from U. S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Monthly Labor Review. LXIX (September, 1949),
276; for 1948, ibid.. LXXI (September, 1950), 360; for 1949,
ibid., LXXIII (November, 1951), 561; for years 1950-51,
ibid.. LXXVI (February, 1953), 156; for 1952 from U. S,
Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin,
XVI (November, 1953), 13; for 1953, ibid. . XVII (November,
1954), 18; for 1954, ibid., XVIII (November, 1955), 19; for
years 1955-56, ibid., XX (November, 1957) 20; for years
1957-58, ibid.. X X W (November, 1959), 20; for 1959, ibid. ,
XXIV (November, 1961), 17; for year 1960-61, ibid., XXV
(November, 1962), 18; for years 1962-63, ibid.. XXVII (No
vember, 1964), 17. Effective rates of return paid to deposit
holders in postal savings are interpolated calendar yields
from calculated fiscal year deposits and interest payments
data from 1946-63 from each yearly, U. S. Congress, House
Document^ Report of Operations of the Postal Savings
System /year/. Average yields on taxable, marketable
securities for the years 1946-48 from Federal Reserve
Bulletin. XXXV (January, 1959), 51; for the years 1949-51,

28

ibid.,
XXXVIII (January, 1952), 60; for the years 1952-54,
ibid.. XLI (January, 1955), 47; for the years 1955-57,
ibid.,
XLIV (January, 1958), 49 and 84; for the years
1958-60, ibid.. XLVII (January, 1961), 60; for the years
1961-63, ibid.. L (January, 1964), 70.
Note 1. Effective rates of return paid to share or
deposit holders of a composite near money are calculated,
weighted averages of rates of return paid by savings and
loan associations, mutual savings banks, credit unions,
commercial banks and the postal savings system.
The
weights were respective quantities of deposits or shares
invested in each savings outlet; see Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, Savings and Home Finaneing Source Book. 1964.
p. 13.
Note 2. Nominal savings bond yields are not strictly
comparable with the effective rates of return paid to share
or deposit holders of the indicated financial intermedi
aries.
To the extent that nominal yields offered by these
intermediaries exceeded the effective yields paid, the
yield comparisons shown above overstate the relative yield
attractiveness of each group of savings bonds.
Note 3.
In order to simplify the presentation, bond
yields of series E are indicated only in Chart 2-1-A;
bond yields of series F or J, only in Chart 2-1-B.
In
order to compare the yields of both groups of bonds to
both types of competitive rates of interest, the yields
of both groups of savings bonds must be mentally inter
changed.
In this respect, Chart 2-2 is helpful.
Note 4. Nominal yields for F or J bonds consist
of yields only for the F bonds until April 30, 1952;
beginning May 1, 1952, J bonds only.
Nominal J bonds
yields are not indicated for the years after 1957, since
the sales of these bonds were discontinued.
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government securities and the effective rates paid by
major financial institutions.

These data can be used to

derive a variety of yield differentials involving both
series E and series F (later J) savings bonds.

Three types

of yield differentials for each category are shewn in
Chart 2-2.

The first is termed the opportunity cost of

purchasing a nonmarketable savings bond rather than a
marketable government security.

The importance of this

terminology will be apparent later when the demand for sav
ings bonds is tested empirically.

It is important to note

at this point that a negative opportunity cost indicates
that the yield on savings bonds exceeds that on marketable
government securities.

That is, a negative yield differen

tial in Chart 2-2-A indicates a "premium" on savings bonds.
The second yield differential involves the opportunity cost
of holding a savings bond rather than near moneys offered by
financial intermediaries.
is used.

A three year time-holding-period

Again, a negative yield differential indicates a

"premium" on savings bonds.

The third yield differential

is termed the opportunity cost of redeeming a savings bond
in order to purchase a marketable government security.

A

negative yield differential indicates a financial gain is
expected in redeeming outstanding savings bonds in order to
purchase an intermediate-term marketable government security.
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Sources and Notes to Chart 2-2
Sources:

Calculated from the data cited in Chart 2-1.

Note to Charts 2-2-A.
In order to approximate the
opportunity cost of purchasing a nonmarketable savings bond
rather than a marketable government security, at least two
yield differentials appear appropriate.
For long-term
lenders the differential between the average yield on long
term (ten years or more) marketable government securities
and the maturity yield on a
savings bond is used; for short
term lenders, the differential between the average yield on
short-term (9-12 months) marketable government issues and
the yield on a savings bond held for one year.
A negative
yield differential indicates that a "premium" is expected in
purchasing and holding a savings bond.
Note to Charts 2-2-B.
In order to approximate the
opportunity cost of holding a savings bond rather than near
moneys offered by financial institutions, a single yield
differential simplifies the numerous comparisons that are
possible.
That is, the differential between the average
return paid to depositors or shareholders as indicated by
the composite near money and the yield on a savings bond
held for three years is used.
A negative yield differen
tial indicates that a "premium" is expected in purchasing
and holding savings bonds for three years.
Note to Charts 2-2-C. In order to approximate the
opportunity cost of redeeming a savings bond in order to
purchase a marketable government security, a single dif
ferential appears sufficient and appropriate, i.e., the
differential between the prospective yield to maturity at
a time-holding-period of five years for E bonds and seven
years for F or J bonds, and the average yield on inter
mediate-term (3-5 years) marketable government obligations.
A negative yield differential indicates that a financial
gain is expected in redeeming savings bonds in order to
purchase the intermediate-term government security.

As can be seen in Charts 2-1 and 2-2, the yield at
tractiveness of new issues of savings bonds during the first
phase of the postwar period began to deteriorate somewhat

32
when compared to the yields on marketable government
securities and, to a greater extent, when compared to
those on near moneys offered by financial intermediaries.
(That is, the opportunity costs of purchasing and holding
savings bonds increased.)

The deterioration occurred not

only in the attractiveness of the yields on new savings
bonds, but also in the attractiveness of the prospective
yields to maturity on outstanding savings bonds.

In the

former case, purchases of savings bonds became less desir
able; in the latter, early redemption became more attrac
tive as the opportunity cost of redeeming savings bonds
declined.
Actually, the "premium" of the maturity yield for
savings bonds, i.e., the yield in excess of the average
yield on long-term marketable government bonds, changed
relatively little as the rigid support of the government
bond market continued.

However, as the Federal Reserve's

support of short-term government security prices became
somewhat less rigid, the market yields on these issues
increased slightly.

Thus, the increases in the opportunity

costs of purchasing and holding savings bonds affected
short-term rather than long-term lenders.

Likewise, it

became less costly to redeem savings bonds and purchase
alternative assets.

Similarly, the attractiveness of
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savings bonds also deteriorated in comparison to near
moneys offered by financial intermediaries, especially
shares offered by insured credit unions.
The changes which occurred from 1947 to 1950 were
minor, however,

in comparison to the more drastic develop

ments in the second phase of the postwar period.

Following

the accord in 1951, interest rates on competitive invest
ments exhibited cyclical fluctuations around a rising trend.
As a result of the rising interest rates,

the Treasury made

significant changes in their offerings of savings bonds in
1952, 1957, and 1959.

Each change represented an attempt to

restore, in part, the attractiveness of the yields on savings
bonds.

16

The first new basket of savings bonds following the
accord contained a revised series E bond, the replacement

The beginning of the second phase of the postwar
period roughly coincided with the period in which the E
bonds sold during the war began to mature.
Therefore, even
prior to the first major change in the post-accord savings
bond program, the Treasury had modified the program in order
to avoid a continuing cash drain from redemptions of E bonds
at maturity.
The holders of E bonds maturing on or after
May 1, 1951 were offered three options.
Option 1 offered holders cash payment at maturity, as
originally contracted.
Option 2 offered holders an auto
matic extension of an additional term to maturity of ten
years.
During the first seven and one-half years after the
original date of maturity, the matured E bonds outstanding
would appreciate in value at a rate of 2.50 per cent (simple)
interest per year; for the remainder of the extended term,
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of F and G bonds with J and K bonds, and a new series H
bond.

In addition to the new series, the primary differ

ence in these offerings involved a change in yield struc
tures for new issues.^
A higher schedule of yields was adopted for new issues
of E bonds in order to increase their yields relative to
financial intermediary claims and, possibly to some extent,
to adjust to the evolving yield curve for marketable govern
ment securities.

The maturity yield of new E bonds was

increased from 2.90 per cent to the statutory ceiling of
3.0 per cent; while this increase was granted, however, the
original term to maturity was reduced from ten years to nine
years, eight months.

In addition, the wide spread between

shorter term yields on savings bonds and their maturity

matured E bonds outstanding would appreciate in value in
order to yield 2.90 per cent interest per annum compounded
semiannually by the end of the extended term to maturity.
Option 3 offered holders an exchange of their E bonds for
current-income G bonds.
Since these G bonds were redeem
able on a calendar month's notice, at par value, they were
different from the series G bonds obtained by direct pur
chase.
For more details about these options, see Treasury
Bulletin (April, 1951), pp. A-l and A-2.
^ S e r i e s E, F, and G bonds were introduced on May 1,
1952; series H bonds were offered for sale beginning June 1,
1952.
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yield was reduced significantly, even more than the
maturity yield was (could be) increased.

But, of course,

the new yield structure still provided a penalty for early
redemption, although a smaller penalty than previously.
(See Chart A-l in Appendix A.)
New issues of E bonds also provided for an optional
extended term to maturity of ten years.

During the second

ten year period, the original maturity value would appre
ciate in value in order to yield at extended maturity 3.0
per cent interest.

18

New issues of E bonds also differed

^®The original schedules of redemption values and
yields on E bonds outstanding prior to May 1, 1952, were
not revised.
Similar schedules for the extended term to
maturity, however, were revised for some of these bonds.
Upon maturity, E bonds bearing an original issue date from
May 1, 1942 through April 1, 1952 could be held for a tenyear, extended term yielding 2.95 per cent; however, upon
maturity, E bonds bearing an original issue date from May
1, 1941 through April 1942 could be held only for the ex
tended term that was granted as an option earlier in 1951.
(See footnote 16.)
In cases where the maturing E bond was not held for
the optional extended term, holders were granted two op
tions.
The first was for the holders to accept a cash pay
ment at the first maturity date, as originally contracted.
The second option was for holders to exchange, at maturity,
the E bond for the new series K current-income bond.
The
conditions under which these exchanges could be made were
similar to those previously granted in exchanges of E bonds
for G bonds.
For additional details, see Treasury Bulletin (May,
1952), pp. A-l through A-9.
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from the original offerings in that the annual limit on
purchases was doubled to $20,000 in maturity value.
The new J and K bonds were designed as substitutes for
series F and G bonds, respectively.

Many of the basic fea

tures of these bonds, therefore, were similar to those of
their predecessors.

The only differences involved certain

changes designed to enhance the attractiveness of the new
series.
The J and K bonds were made slightly more liquid than
their predecessors in that the advance notice of sixty days
for early redemption of F and G bonds was reduced to a cal
endar month.

However, the stipulation that these securities

could not be redeemed until six months after issue date was
not changed.
The level and structure of yields for J and K bonds
were modified also.

Even though greater leeway existed

under the statutory interest rate ceiling (3.0 per cent),
the Treasury increased the maturity yields of both series
to only 2.76 per cent.

Perhaps this represented the

Treasury's concern with holding interest costs on the
national debt to a minimum.

While maturity yields were

raised, the original term to maturity of twelve years for
F and G bonds was kept intact.

A significant reduction in

the spread between shorter term yields and the maturity
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yielc also took place.

(See Chart A-l in Appendix A.)

In

fact, the changes in the yield structure on J and K bonds
were even more pronounced than that on E bonds.
The calendar year limit on J and K bond purchases was
doubled to $200,000 (issue price), similar to that for E
bonds.

However, unlike E bonds, no extended term to maturity

was offered either to purchasers of series J and K bonds or
to holders of the outstanding F and G bonds.

In all other

features, J and K bonds were identical to those of F and G
bonds.

As with their predecessors, series J and K bonds were

equally attractive in terms of yields and liquidity.
In comparing the revised series E bonds with the new
J and K issues, it is clear that the former retained their
greater attractiveness in terms of yields and liquidity.
The yields of new E bonds were greater than those for J and
K bonds, as indicated in Charts 2-1 and 2-2; because of the
necessary month's notice before redeeming J and K bonds and
the longer period after the issue date before these issues
were eligible for redemption, new E bonds were more liquidAfter considerable popularity of the current-income
19
G bond had been demonstrated,

19

the new series H bond was

Purchases of G bonds exceeded those of F bonds at
all times.
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also designed to pay interest to individuals on the same
basis.

Actually, the features of series H bonds were in

some respects a hybrid of those of both series E and G
bonds.

Series H bonds were different from G bonds (and

similar to

Ebonds) inthat interest was graduated upward

semiannually over their term to maturity.

When redemption

was not restricted, H bonds were always redeemable at par
value, whereas G bonds (E bonds) were redeemable at dis
counts from par value (maturity value) prior to maturity.
Identical to new E bonds, series H bonds yielded 3.0
per cent interest per annum at the end of the term to m a 
turity of nine years eight months.

In addition, the yield

structures for the semiannual interest payments to the
holders of

H bonds and the appreciation of value to the

holders of

Ebonds were similar.

Series H bonds had

restrictions on early redemption identical to those for
series J and K bonds.

Thus, they were redeemable for cash

prior to maturity six months after the first day of the
month in which they were purchased, but only on one calendar
month's notice.

The new E bond calendar year limit on pur

chases of $20,000 was adopted for H bonds.

In contrast to

the new E bonds, H bonds were offered only in denominations
of $500, $1,000, $5,000, and $10,000 par value in order to
avoid the payment of interest in excessively small amounts.
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No optional extended term to maturity was offered to the
holders of H bonds.
In summary, the relative yields of series H bonds
were approximately equal to those of new E bonds
2-1 and 2-2).

(Charts

However, H bonds--like J and K bonds--were

slightly less liquid than new E bonds because of the longer
restricted redemption period after the issue date and the
month's notice required in redeeming these bonds prior to
maturity.
The Federal Reserve moved toward a more restrictive
monetary policy following the 1952 revision in yields on
savings bonds.

The changes in yield structures, therefore,

only temporarily increased the relative attractiveness of
new savings bonds when compared to marketable government
securities and near moneys offered by financial intermedi
aries.

The rapid rise in the level of interest rates on

these competitive investments soon eliminated the temporary
gains for new savings bonds (Charts 2-1 and 2-2).

20

Later in this study the various series of savings
bonds offered during the postwar period are combined into
two groups.
Group 1 consists of series E initially, but
series E and H beginning in 1952.
Group II consists of F
and G bonds initially, but series F, G, J, and K bonds be
ginning in 1952.
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The decline in the level of interest rates of market
able government securities during the 1953-54 recession
significantly enhanced the relative yields of all savings
bonds.

With respect to near moneys offered by financial

intermediaries,

the recession at least reduced the rapid

rate at which the relative attractiveness of savings bonds
had been deteriorating.
After

the 1953-54 recession,

interest rates on competi

tive investments rose above the level that had been reached
prior to the recession. The result, of course, was a fur
ther deterioration in the relative yields of savings bonds
by 1957.

Certainly, the changing yield differentials were

unfavorable for all series of bonds, but generally more so
for J and K bonds than for the higher yielding E and H bonds.
According to the terminology adopted earlier, the opportunity
costs of purchasing and holding savings bonds rose sharply,
while the cost of redeeming savings bonds declined sharply.
(See Charts 2-1 and 2-2.)
Even though the attractiveness of savings bond yields
was deteriorating, the maturity yield for series E and H
bonds could not be increased without a change in the statu
tory interest rate ceiling which had existed since 1935.
The time needed to obtain this change (from 3.00 to 3.26
per cent) delayed the introduction of a new basket of E and
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H bonds until 1957.

The situation with J and K bonds was

considered even more critical.

Because of the greater

sensitivity to interest rates among purchasers of J and K
bonds,

the Treasury was led to discontinue the offerings of

these bonds.

This brought to a close the Treasury's experi

mentation with nonmarketable savings bonds designed for in
vestors of substantial means.
The new offerings of E and H bonds in 1957 possessed
ratios of purchase price to maturity value identical to
those which were adopted for the original discountappreciation and current-income bonds.

Jn general, however,

the changes in the offerings of E and H bonds in 1957 were
similar to those made for E bonds in 1952, i.e., the m a 
turity yield was increased and the spread between shorter
term yields and the maturity yield was reduced.

The magni

tude of the change, on the other hand, differed.
The term to maturity of new issues of E bonds was
reduced to eight years eleven months;

in addition, the

maturity yield was increased to 3.25 per cent.

This in

crease of 0.25 percentage points in maturity yield was
larger than the 1952 increase by 0.15 percentage points;
however, the actual increase granted was probably less than
the increase the Treasury would have allowed had Congress
granted its request to increase the statutory interest rate
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ceiling to 4.25 per cent.

Since Congress set the interest

rate ceiling much lower at 3.26 per cent, significantly
larger increases in short- and intermediate-term yields
were set by the Treasury in order to compensate for their
lack of leeway in increasing the maturity yield.

21

(See

Chart A-l in Appendix A.)
Yield changes similar to those for new E bonds were
adopted for the revised H bonds.

In contrast to the change

for the new E bonds, the term to maturity for H bonds was
increased to ten years while the maturity yield was in
creased to the same rate as for E bonds, 3.25 per cent.
With the higher maturity yield for E and H bonds, the cal
endar year limit on purchases was reduced to $10,000

Several differences in the 1952 and 1957 changes
are noteworthy.
The relative increases in yields at
time-holding-periods of less than three years were smaller
than those in 1952; a continued attempt to discourage
early redemption probably prohibited any larger increases
in these yields.
The yield at a time-holding-period of
three but less than three and one-half years was increased
to 2.90 per cent, the level of the maturity yield of series
A-D and series E bonds prior to 1952.
For the range of
time-holding-periods of three years to the date of maturity,
the corresponding range in yields for E bonds progressively
increased from 2.90 per cent to 3.25 per cent.
These higher
yields contrasted sharply with the 1952 interest rate struc
ture, which went from 2.25 per cent to 3.00 per cent.
See
Chart A-l in Appendix A.
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(maturity value) for each series.

No change was made in the

original or the extended terms to maturity on E bonds out*
standing prior to February 1, 1957.

No extended term to

maturity option was granted to H bondholders.
The 1957-58 recession was even more significant than
the 1957 revision in the yield structure in enhancing tem
porarily the relative yields of new issues of E and H bonds.
These increases in yields on savings bonds relative to those
on alternative investments were only temporary, however.
part this was due to the shortness of the recession.

In

The

restrictive monetary policy that was pursued following the
recession rapidly tightened the financial markets, and the
level of interest rates on marketable government securities
soared to a new postwar peak; yields on near moneys offered
by financial intermediaries also rose rapidly. In fact, the
relative yields of E and H bonds were reduced by more than
they had been increased earlier by the 1957 revision in
yield structure and the 1957-58 recession.

Therefore, a

third basket of savings bonds was required by 1959.
In that year, Congress reluctantly changed the statu
tory interest rate ceiling above the 3.26 per cent ceiling
set in 1957.

While Increasing the interest rate ceiling

by 0.99 percentage points to a maximum rate of 4.25 per
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cent, the authority to Increase interest rates up to this
maximum was again granted to the President, for use at his
discretion.

This increase in the statutory ceiling was

significantly greater than the increase of 0.26 percentage
points granted in 1957 and thereby provided greater flexi
bility in the Treasury's operations.
On June 1, 1959, the third basket of savings bonds
since the accord was introduced.
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Insofar as the interest

yields were increased for new issues of E and H bonds, this
offering was similar to the 1957 offering.

However, since

the yields for both series were increased also on outstand
ing savings bonds, this offering was unprecedented.

This

important change represented an attempt by the Treasury to
reduce the opportunity cost of redeeming outstanding savings
bonds and thereby avoid or reduce future cash drains and re
financings.
The maturity yield for new issues of E and H bonds
was increased to 3.75 per cent.

This increase of 0.50 per

centage points was substantially larger than the earlier

22

In 1958 the list of eligible purchasers of E and H
bonds was modified to include all investors other than
commercial banks; at this time also, maturing F and G
bonds were made exchangeable for E and H bonds without
regard to the annual limitations imposed upon purchases
of these bonds.
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increases in 1952 and 1957.

The increase in the maturity

yield of new issues of E bonds was accomplished by further
reducing the term to maturity to seven years nine months-the shortest ever.

With more leeway in increasing the matur

ity yield than it had enjoyed in 1957, the Treasury widened
the spread between the shorter term yields and the maturity
yield in order to discourage early redemption.
A-l in Appendix A.)

(See Chart

It may be recalled that this spread had

been reduced significantly in 1957.
Outstanding E bonds with issue dates from Hay 1, 1942
through May 1, 1949 were given their second ten-year ex
tended term to maturity option.

All other outstanding E

bonds as well as new E bonds were granted a single ten-year
extended term to maturity option.

23

As with the preceding recession,

the 1960-61 recession

had a substantial effect in reducing the yields on alterna
tive investments relative to those on new issues of E and H
bonds.

On the other hand, the less rapid rise in the level

of interest rates after the 1960-61 recession did not vitiate

23

For changes in yields on E and H bonds outstanding,
see Treasury Bulletin (October, 1959), pp. A-2 through A-4;
ibid., (December, 1959), pp. A-4 through A-20.
In 1961, H bond holders were granted the option of an
extended term; see Treasury Bulletin (September, 1961), p.
A-3 for this announcement, and ibid., (October, 1961), pp.
A-3 through A-6, for the published schedules of redemption
values and yields.
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as rapidly these yield differentials.

However, by the

end of the postwar period the relative yields on E and H
bonds were deteriorating moderately as the level of inter
est rates on competitive investments gradually increased.
(See Charts 2-1 and 2-2.)

The Grouping of Postwar Savings Bonds into Two Categories
A major purpose of this study, as indicated earlier,
is to analyze the demand for savings bonds in the postwar
period.

This is done in Chapters IV and V.

Because of the

complexities presented by the large number of individual
series, it seems desirable to combine these series into a
smaller number of groups in order to facilitate the later
testing of empirical demand functions.
It is possible, of course, to combine series E, F, G,
H, J, and K bonds into a single group.

All savings bonds

were similar in that they were registered, nonmarketable
obligations of the United States government, and provided
their purchasers an equally safe outlet for savings.

All

were designed to attract long-term funds primarily, and
thus offered higher yields the longer they were held.
Generally, all savings bonds were very liquid assets also.
At the option of their owners, with little or no notice,
they were all redeemable for cash virtually at any time
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prior to maturity.

Redemption values and yields for

specified time-holding-periods, too, were known in ad
vance.

Finally, all savings bonds were offered for sale

to specified types of investors, subject to maximum limits
on calendar year purchases.
For regression analysis, however, several problems
arise in considering all savings bonds as a single homo
geneous good.

First, not all series were offered continu

ously during the postwar period.

At various times as many

as four and as few as two series were offered concurrently.
Thus,

the number (and kinds) of choices available to would-

be purchasers varied considerably.

More important, perhaps,

the bonds were subject to significant individual differences
that suggest combining them into at least two groups.
In this study the decision was made to combine series
E and H bonds into group I and series F, G, J, and K bonds
into group II,

This grouping corresponds to the Treasury's

attempt to segregate the market for savings bonds into one
for individual investors and another for nonindividual and
individual investors of substantial means.

24

24

While the

Efforts to segregate markets along these lines were
abandoned in 1957 with the discontinuance of J and K bonds.
In 1958, too, series E and H bonds were made available on
the same terms to all nonbank investors, although purchase
ceilings continued to place a limit on sales to large in
vestors.
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various series within each group are similar in most funda
mental respects, these two groups of bonds appear reasonably
differentiated from one another.
The differentiation between group I and group II bonds
existed in several significant respects.

First, group I

bonds were offered only to individuals prior to 1958,

25

while group II bonds were always available to all investors
other than commercial banks
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until series J and K bonds

were discontinued early in 1957.

Second, the structure of

yields--both the maturity yield and those for shorter holding
periods--was consistently higher on group I bonds.

Third,

yearly purchase quotas were considerably lower for the
first group.

Fourth, small denominations have been much

more important in E bond sales, which account for the bulk
of group I sales,

According to data by George Hanc (repro

duced as Table 2-1), 58 per cent of the dollar amounts of
group I sales from May, 1941 to June, 1958 were in denomi
nations of $100 or less, as compared to only 2 per cent

25

Until 1954, series E and H bonds were sold only to
"natural persons."
In that year, employee savings plans
were added for E bonds only, and both series were made
available to personal trust estates in 1955.
26

Commercial banks, which were normally excluded from
purchasing savings bonds, were permitted to buy series F
and G bonds in special offerings in 1948 and in 1950.
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TABLE 2-1.--Distribution of Cumulative Savings Bond Sales,
by Series, by Denomination of Bond, May 1941-June 1958

Denomination
(Maturity value
in dollars)

Percentage of dollar amounts
(Issue price)

E &
d
27
13
18
2
12
26
1
1

10
25
50
100
200
500
1,000
5,000
10,000
100,000
All denomi
nations

Source:

100

F & J<b>
_

Cumulative
percentages

E & H

G &

-

__

d

—

2

2

4
22
18
51
3

6
28
18
44
2

d
27
40
58
60
72
98
99
100
100

100

100

100

—

—

George Hanc, 0 £. cit., p. 45.

(a)

Series H bonds have been available only in denomi
nations ranging from $500 to $10,000.
Series E
bonds were sold in $10 denominations to armed
forces personnel from June, 1941 through March,
1950.
Series E bonds were sold in $200 denomina
tions for the first time in October, 1945.
Sales
of $10,000 E bonds were authorized May 1, 1952.
E bonds in denominations of $100,000 were issued
to trustees of employee savings plans and in re
issue transactions.

(b)

Sales of $25 F bonds were authorized in December,
1941.
Data on $100,000 denominations are series J
bonds.

(c)

Figures on $100 bonds refer to series G bonds,
while those of $100,000 are for series K bonds.

(d)

Less than 0.5 per cent.
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for group II.

Some 72 per cent of combined sales of F and

J bonds and 64 per cent of combined G and K bonds were in
denominations of $5,000 or more; the comparable figure for
group I was 2 per cent.

27

To the extent that denomination

of bond reflects the purchaser's wealth and/or income--as
must surely be the case to some degree--group I bonds have
been sold to a less affluent purchaser.
Furthermore, several additional distinguishing fea
tures can be implied largely because of the dominance of
series E bonds in group I.

Series E bonds were slightly

more liquid than all other series because of their more
liberal redemption features.

These securities were con

vertible into cash at any time after an initial two-month
waiting period; all other series were redeemable only
after a six month waiting period and on either one- or two

27

George Hanc's data also indicate that bond pur
chases in denominations of $500 or more were approximately
98 per cent of the group II bonds purchased, but only 40
per cent of the group I bonds purchased.
Separate analysis
of these two groups of bonds during the period cited--May,
1941 to June, 1958--would provide for a bond-denominationrange parameter of perhaps $500 or more for group II and
$25 to $1,000 for group I.
Although similar information is not available for
calendar years 1947-63, reference is later made to a bonddenomination-range parameter for the separate analysis of
groups I and II during the postwar period.
Of course, the
parameter utilized is $500 or more for group II and $25 to
$1,000 for group I.
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month's notice.

Savings bonds were either current-income

bonds, which were sold at par and paid current interest , or
discount-appreciation bonds, which were sold at discount and
appreciated in value.

Actually,

there is an apparent over

lap in this respect for the two groups since series E, F,
and J were discount-appreciation bonds and series C, H s and
K were current-income securities; however,

in dollar amounts,

series E has dominated group I sales while G bonds during
the years in which series F and G were sold, and presumably
G and K bonds from 1947 to 1957,

28

28

were dominant in group 11.

Annual gross sales data for each series of bonds are
available for F and G bends, but not for J and K bonds.
Nevertheless, the dominance of the gross sales of group II
bonds by those of series G during the years in which F and
G bonds were sold is so pronounced, there is no reason to
believe that the gross sales of group II bonds were not
also dominated by those of series K during the years in
which J and K bonds were offered for sale.
In this respect,
total gross sales of group II bonds for the years in which
series J and K were sold does not appear to be large enough
to believe that the gross sales of F and J bonds from 1947
to 1957 could possibly have exceeded those of series K from
1952 to 1957.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORY OF THE SAVINGS BOND PROGRAM:
TREASURY OBJECTIVES AND INVESTOR RESPONSE,
MARCH 1, 1935 TO DECEMBER 31, 1963

This chapter completes the history of the savings bond
program.

Primarily, investors' responses in terms of gross

sales, redemptions, net sales, and changes in outstanding
bonds are emphasized.

Treasury Objectives
Economic stabilization was not considered in generally
accepted principles of debt management prior to the Keynesian
impact on economic policies.

A "sound" debt management

policy in 1935 was thought to involve a funding of the debt
Short-term or floating debt was not looked upon with favor.
Excessive reliance on short-term debt was more likely to
expose the Treasury to the mercy of the market,

since the

Treasury would face more holders of maturing debt at any one
time.

A longer debt, on the other hand, would not tie the

Treasury so closely to the market;
cings could be smaller.

in this case, refinan

Long-term debt could more easily be
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adapted to plans for debt retirement, which was likewise
considered to be a worthy endeavor.

In general, debt

retirement
"...was Judged to strengthen the national credit,
to facilitate further borrowing should the need
arise, and to increase the capital available for
industrial growth.
Debt reduction increased con
fidence and gave a favorable tone to^government
finance."1
Debt retirement and refinancing at lower rates would also
keep the interest burden of the debt to a minimum.
Not surprisingly,

the original objectives of the sav

ings bond program were similarly unrelated to cyclical
fluctuations.

According to Henry Murphy:

"Secretary Morgenthau's original purpose in requesting
authorization for the issuance of savings bonds was to
encourage individual thrift and to secure a widespread
distribution of the ownership of the public debt.
By
this means he hoped to give a greater number of indi
vidual citizens a direct financial stake in Federal
finances and in conservation of the purchasing power
of money and of property values in general."2
These major objectives--the encouragement of thrift,
with its anti-inflationary Implications, and the promotion
of a widespread distribution of the ownership of the debt, so
as to increase the individual's stake in and knowledge

^■William E, Laird, "The Changing Views on Debt Manage
ment," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, III
(Autumn, 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 8.
2
Henry Murphy, The National Debt In War And Transition
(New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 35.
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of government finances--have remained continuing concerns
of the program since its inception.

Also of continuing im

portance has been the view that a proper function of the
Government is to provide the small, unsophisticated investor
with an absolutely safe outlet for his funds.

This concern

was reflected in the Treasury's decision to issue securities
which are nonmarketable, redeemable at fixed prices, regis
tered, and available continuously in small denominations at
a large number of sales outlets.
The main impetus to the program came with the Second
World War.

Not only was the Treasury faced with raising

unprecedented amounts of funds, but the impelling need was
to finance the war in the least inflationary manner possible.
In this regard, the sale of savings bonds was considered
anti-inflationary in two respects--savings bond sales di
rectly encouraged thrift (decreased consumption expenditures)
and indirectly avoided the need to borrow from commercial
banks.

With the end of the hostilities, the program was

still considered anti-inflationary in both respects
better yet, "...

Or

funds obtained from the sale of savings

bonds were available for the retirement of bank-held debt,
O

thereby reducing the money supply to that extent."
a

The

Statement by John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury,
in A Compendium of Materials on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal
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money supply argument was repeated frequently throughout the
postwar period, seemingly long after it had lost whatever
measure of validity it might once have possessed.

4

Even before the end of the Second World War at least one
academic economist, Henry Simons,^ began to discuss debt
management in relation to economic stabilization.

Since that

time, the pre-Keynesian "sound” debt management policy has
become less appealing.

Although there is now much disagree

ment as to what constitutes a sound policy, three positions,
with some divergence of viewpoints within each category,
have emerged from the postwar debt management controversy.
In retrospect, Simons, the Committee for Economic Development,
Rolph,

7

Culbertson,

8

and Beard

9

provided the countercyclical

Policies. Joint Committee on the Economic Report, S. Doc.
132, 81st Cong.; 2nd Sess., 1950, p. 8.
^See, for example, Thomas R. Beard, "Debt Management
and the Money Supply," Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth
Annua1 Conference of the National Tax Association. 1965.
pp. 58-73.
^Henry Simons, "On Debt Policy," Journal of Political
Economy. LII (December, 1944), pp. 356-61.
^Committee for Economic Development, Managing The Federal
Debt (New York:
1954), pp. 1-38.
^Earl Rolph, "Principles of Debt Management," American
Economic Review. XLVII (June, 1957), pp. 302-320.
8j. M. Culbertson, "A Positive Debt Management Program,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics. XLI (May, 1959), pp.
89-98.

9

Thomas R. Beard, "Counter-Cyclical Debt Management--A
Suggested Interpretation." Southern Economic Journal. XXX
(January, 1964), pp. 244-252.
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framework.
and Gaines.
Smith

13

The neutral doctrine was developed by Friedman
11

To a large extent, Treasury officials

12

and

held that debt management had little to contribute

to economic stabilization.
In practice, the Treasury's debt management operations
in marketable instruments throughout the postwar period were
generally procyclical.

Beginning in the later 1950's, the

Treasury's policy came under increasing criticism by advo
cates of countercyclical debt management.

A countercyclical

debt management policy was viewed as an important supplement
to, but not a substitute for, conventional monetary and fis
cal policies.

In achieving the goal of economic stabiliza

tion, the alleged high interest cost of employing a counter
cyclical program was not judged to be a valid deterrent to

Milton Friedman, A Program For Monetary Stability
(New York:
Fordham University Press, 1959), especially
pp. 52-76.
^ T . C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management
(New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), especially pp.
272-276.
12

See, for example, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, Employment, Growth. and Price Levels, Part 6C,
"The Government's Management of Its Monetary, Fiscal, and
Debt Operations," 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. , 1959.
^ W a r r e n Smith, Debt Management in the United States,
Study Paper 19 for the Joint Economic Committee in connec
tion with the "Study of Employment, Growth, and Price
Levels," 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960.
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its use.

Furthermore, debt management operations aimed at

minimizing interest costs would have a decidedly procyclical
impact on the economy, since the sale of longer-term securi
ties during periods of recession and shorter-term issues
during periods of prosperity would restrict liquidity in the
former periods and increase
On the other hand,

liquidity in the latter.

the savings bond program was

neglected to a surprising extent by students of government
finance.^

The size of

marketable debt held by

the program in comparison to that of
the public evidently explains the

brief coverage given to it in the literature.

That this

approach was also followed by the advocates of countercycli
cal debt management is even more surprising since the post
war operations of the program undoubtedly had an important
liquidity impact on the economy, too.'
Numerous questions,

infrequently posed and seldom

answered in the literature, arise in regard to the appro
priateness of the formulation and implementation of a counter
cyclical savings bond program.
questions, however,

Providing answers for these

lies beyond the scope of this study.

The questions are nevertheless posed at this time.

First,

^ O n e notable exception is the study by George Hanc,
The United States Savings Bond Program In The Postwar Period
(New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,
1962).
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what is the liquidity of savings bonds when advance notice
for redemption prior to maturity and restricted redemption
immediately after the purchase date are considered?

Second,

what liquidity position do savings bonds command in relation
to short- and long-term marketable government securities?
Third, if savings bonds vis-A-vis marketable government se
curities are more likely to be purchased and held by indi
viduals, is a countercyclical savings bond program required
in addition to a countercyclical management of the marketable
debt held by the public?

Fourth, given a statutory interest

rate ceiling and an economic environment which is relatively
unstable, can sufficiently high interest rates on savings
bonds be adopted to encourage (inhibit) the sale (redemptions)
of savings bonds during periods of prosperity?

Fifth, given

that the statutory interest rate ceiling is not prohibitive,
are institutional restraints too formidable to permit fre
quent increases in yields on nonmarketable savings bonds as
may be required when economic conditions are relatively un
stable?

Sixth, what is the efficacy of a temporary cessation

of the sale of savings bonds during periods of recession?
And finally, how can redemptions of savings bonds be encour
aged during recessions since the opportunity costs of holding
savings bonds decline during these periods?
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On one hand, the efficacy of a temporary cessation of
the sale of savings bonds during recessions has been denied
by Treasury officials.

In 1958, for example, Secretary of

the Treasury Anderson argued,
"The habit of thrift is not something to be encouraged
at one time and discouraged at another.
It is too
basic, /and he added7 as a matter of fact, the pre
sent economic downturn is the aftermath of an infla
tionary boom which would have been much milder had
Americans saved more than they did in recent years."
On the other hand, Bunting--in his proposal that the powers
and responsibilities of the Federal Reserve be increased to
include all aspects of debt management--suggested that sav
ings bonds should be made marketable and redeemable only at
maturity.

He further suggested that in

"...this less attractive form these bonds would prob
ably be less widely held; but to the extent they
remained in the hands of private individuals, they
could become an especially effective means of in
creasing aggregate liquidity when deflation threatened
For if, on the average, $5 billion were to come to
maturity per year, the monetary authority could refund
by selling bonds to a Federal Reserve Bank and thereby
inject new media directly past 'the financial community'
into the balances of citizens."16

15"share in America," address at the savings bond
campaign in New York City, April 7, 1958, reprinted in
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1958. pp.
262-265.
^ R o b e r t L. Bunting, "A Debt Management Proposal,"
Southern Economic Journal, XXV (January, 1959) , p. 341.
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A review of the operations of the savings bond program
from March 1, 1935 to December 31, 1963, by periods, follows.
As will be shown, changes in responses of investors to
Treasury offerings of savings bonds were probably large
enough to have had an important liquidity impact on the
economy.

During calendar years 1951-63, the liquidity im

pact was generally procyclical since recessions were rela
tively short in duration during this period of time.

It

appears that the advocates of countercyclical debt manage
ment would gain more support for their position if debt
management were expanded to consider the liquidity impact
of the savings bond program.

When this approach is adopted,

answers to the questions previously posed would come forth.

Investor Response in the Period of Origin,
March _1, 1935 to April 3 0 . 1941
The responses of investors to Treasury offerings of
savings bonds from March 1, 1935 to April 30, 1941 are indi
cated largely by the data for gross sales and redemptions of
series A-D bonds.

As shown in Table 3-1, both gross sales

and redemptions increased during the period.

In general,

however, the gradual growth indicated for gross sales did
exceed the rising, but small, amounts of redemptions which
did occur.

Investments in series A-D bonds were probably

induced by the attractiveness of the features of savings
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TABLE 3-1.--Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of Series
A-D Bonds during the Period of Origin, March 1, 1935 to
April 30, 1941
(Millions of dollars)

Fiscal
year

Gross
sales
(Issue
price)

Redemptions
(Issue price
plus accrued
discount)

Proportion of
redemptions to
gross sales
(Per cent)
Net
sales

Yearly

Cumulative

63

1

62

1

1

1936

264

11

253

4

4

1937

515

36

479

7

6

1938

488

67

421

14

9

1939

688

82

606

12

10

1940

1,107

115

992

10

10

824

147

676

18

12

3,948

459

3,489

1935*1*

1941(2)
Total

12

Source:
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury
on the State of the Finances for Fiscal Year Ended 1941, p. 24.
Note:
Net sales equal gross sales at issue price minus
redemptions at issue price plus accrued discount on bonds
redeemed.
Differences, cumulations, and percentages are
based on unrounded figures.
(1)

March 1, 1935 to June 30, 1935.

(2)

July 1, 1940 to April 30, 1941.
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bonds.

In addition to safety of principal, series A-D bonds

provided investors declining opportunity costs of purchasing
savings bonds during the period.

Since the opportunity costs

of holding A-D bonds also declined, increasing redemptions
during the period indicate that some purchasers were un
doubtedly short-term lenders.

Cumulatively, however, redemp

tions accounted for only 12 per cent of gross sales (Table
3-1).
While pursuing the objectives of the savings bond pro
gram, the Treasury provided itself with an expanding source
of cash receipts.

In fact, total net sales of series A-D

bonds provided the Treasury with $3,489 million (Table 3-1).
To the extent that early redemptions were penalized by low
yields relative to marketable government securities, of
course, the cost of short-term borrowing for the Treasury
fell over the period as early redemptions increased during
the period.
The general acceptance of savings bonds by investors
also allowed the Treasury to place somewhat greater reliance
on nonmarketable debt in financing its deficits.

Even though

the national debt increased by 65 per cent from June 30, 1935
to April 30, 1941, the concurrent growth in holdings of
savings bonds changed the composition of the national debt
from 0.2 to 7.7 per cent savings bonds.

(See Table 3-2).

63
TABLE 3-2.--Outstanding Series A-D Bonds and the Federal
Gross Debt by Fiscal Years, 1933-41
(Millions of dollars)

Outstanding
savings
bonds

Fiscal
year

Federal
gross
debt

Proportion of outstanding
savings bonds to Federal
gross debt
(Per cent)

1935

62

28,701

0.2

1936

316

33,545

0.9

1937

800

36,427

2.2

1938

1,238

37,167

3.3

1939

1,868

40,445

4.6

1940

2,905

42,971

6.8

1941(1)

3,647

47,236

7.7

Source:
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.
1941. p. 555; ibid. 1943. p. 606.
Note:
Federal gross debt outstanding excludes guaran
teed securities issued by the Treasury.
(1)

April 30, 1941 rather than June 30, 1941.

Investor Response in the Expansionary Period.
May 1. 1941 to December 3 1 . 1946
The responses of investors to Treasury offerings of
savings bonds from May 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946 are indi
cated to a large extent by the data for gross sales and redemp
tions of series E, F, and G bonds combined.

As can be seen
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in Table 3-3, the ending of the Second World War coincides
roughly with a common turning point in the early trends dis
played by gross sales and redemptions.

In the former, a

rapid expansion is reversed; in the latter, a rising trend
is accelerated.
The rapid rise in gross sales from May 1, 1941 to the
end of the war was perhaps largely due to the substantial
rise in income during the war.

At the same time, there was

a scarcity of consumer goods, so that the aggregate volume
of savings was relatively large.

In part, aggressive

solicitations, appeals to patriotism, and success in expand
ing the membership in payroll savings plans to 25 million
by m i d - 1 9 4 5 ^ were contributing factors also.

In addition,

as an alternative either to hoarding or acquiring other
liquid financial assets, savings bonds were relatively at
tractive.

In this respect, however, some purchasers were

undoubtedly short-term lenders since early redemptions in
creased continuously from May 1, 1941 to the end of the war
(Table 3-3).18

^ A n n u a l Report of the Secretary of the Treasury. 1946.
p. 47.
18

If redemptions of series A-D bonds had been included
also, total redemptions would be slightly larger than that
indicated in Table 3-3.
In 1945 and 1946, respectively, re
demptions of series A-D bonds increased as series A and B
bonds were redeemed at maturity.
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TABLE 3-3.--Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of
Series E, F, and G Bonds, during the Expansionary
Period, May 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946
(Millions of dollars)

Gross
sales
Calendar (Issue
year
price)

Redemptions^ ^
(Issue price
plus accrued
discount)

Net
sales

Proportion of
redemptions to
gross sales
(Per cent)
Yearly Cumulative

1941*2)

2,537

14

2,523

i

1

1942

9,157

246

8,911

3

2

1943

13,729

1,504

12,225

11

7

1944

16,044

3,263

12,781

20

12

1945

12,937

5,332

7,605

41

19

1946

7,427

6,038

1,389

81

27

Total

61,831

16,397

45,434

—

27

Source:
U.S., Office of the Secretary, Treasury
Bulletin (March, 1948), p. 25.
Note:
Net sales equal gross sales at issue price
minus redemptions at issue price plus accrued discount
on bonds redeemed.
Differences, cumulations, and per
centages are based on unrounded figures.
(1) Beginning October 1944, redemptions include small
amounts of unclassified series A-D redemptions.
(2)

May 1, 1941 through December 31, 1941 only.
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A couple of factors can be cited to explain the rapid
decline In gross sales and the acceleration In redemptions
Immediately following the end of the war.

First, the Treasury

was no longer pressed to raise large amounts of funds.

The

Eight War Loan Drive, which was conducted during the last
quarter of 1945, was in fact the last of the large scale
appeals for funds.

Thereafter, the promotion of the payroll

savings plan became less vigorous and, in part, contributed
to the drastic decline in its participating membership to
7.5 million in mid-1946.

19

Second, but of greater import

ance apparently, the urgent demand for consumer goods-which was built up during the war period while a vast accu
mulation of liquid financial assets occurred-^contributed
to a decline in personal savings out of current income.
The savings bond program was an extremely important
source of cash receipts for the Treasury from May 1, 1941
to December 31, 1946.

Cumulatively, net sales provided

$45,434 million in spite of redemptions of 27 per cent of

20
gross sales (Table 3-3).

To the extent that early redemp

tions were penalized by low yields relative to marketable

^9Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1946,
p. 47.
20

When redemptions of series A-D bonds are included,
total redemptions average 28 per cent of cumulative gross
sales.
Cumulative net sales, in this case, provided only
$44,529 million.
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government securities, the cost of short-term borrowing for
the Treasury fell over the period as early redemptions in
creased during the period.
As indicated by the rise in savings bonds as a percent
age of the national debt, the Treasury was able to place
greater reliance on the sale of nonmarketable debt in financ
ing its deficits during the war.

(See Table 3-4).

The sale

of savings bonds during the Eight War Loan Drive, on the
other hand, enlarged the cash balances of the Treasury
greatly in excess of its immediate need for funds.

By re

tiring marketable debt, especially that held by commercial
banks, the Treasury began to reduce its excess cash balances
in February, 1946.

Since holdings of savings bonds expanded

simultaneously with the reduction of marketable debt, these
bonds accounted for 19.2 per cent of the national debt by
the end of the period.
As can be seen in Table 3-4, outstanding group I bonds
at the end of the war accounted for approximately two-thirds
of the combined holdings of groups I and 11 bonds.

Concur

rently with the reduction of marketable debt in 1946, out
standing group II bonds increased significantly, but out
standing group I bonds declined slightly.

Perhaps, uncertainty

in the financial markets created a greater net shift to sav
ings bonds of group II than of group I, and the urgent demand

TABLE 3-4.--Outstanding Savings Bonds by Groups of Bonds and Federal Gross Debt,
Calendar Years 1941-46
(Millions of dollars)

Amount outstanding at end
Calendar
year

Total

Savings bonds
Group II
Group I

o>E

year
Federal
gross
debt

Proportion of savings bonds
to Federal gross debt

Total

(Per cent)
Group I
1 Group II

j
1941

6,140

1,134

1,390

58,020

10.6

2.0

2.4

1942

15,050

6,923

4,524

108,170

13.9

6.4

4.2

1943

27,363

15,957

7,789

165,877

16.5

9.6

4.7

1944

40,361

25,515

11,208

230,630

17.5

11.1

4.9

1945

48,183

30,727

13,979

278,115

17.3

11.0

5.0

1946

49,776

30,263

16,365

259,149

19.2

11.7

6.3

Source: For savings bond data, Treasury Bulletin (March, 1948), p. 24; for gross
debt data, each yearly issue of the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury from
1942-48.
Note: Group I bonds include only series E bonds; group II bonds, series F and G
bonds; all outstanding series are included in total savings bonds. Federal gross debt
excludes guaranteed securities issued by the Treasury.

69
for consumer goods created a greater net shift out of savings
bonds of group I than of group II.

Investor Response in the Postwar Period.
Calendar Years 1947-63
Prior to the postwar period, the activity in savings
bonds produced a net cash inflow for the Treasury while the
outstanding amounts of these bonds expanded.

Generally, many

factors contributed to this growth in the program.
mary ones were:

The pri

(1) a shift to savings media of unquestioned

safety in reaction to the financial crisis of the early 1930's;
(2) the attractiveness of savings bonds in comparison to al
ternative investments in terms of yields and liquidity; and
(3) the massive promotion of savings bonds via war loan drives
and the regularity of purchases through payroll savings plans
when consumer goods were scarce.
During the postwar period, in sharp contrast,

the pro

gram resulted in a net cash outflow for the Treasury while
outstanding savings bonds declined slightly.

(See Table 3-5.)

Generally, this decline reflects the disappearance or weaken
ing of the factors that earlier contributed to the favorable
acceptance of savings bonds.

In attempting to attribute this

decline to causal factors--of which the yield attractiveness
of savings bonds vis-£-vis alternative investments appears to
be the predominant single factor--the activity in savings
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bonds during the postwar period is divided into two phases.
The first phase, which extends through calendar years 1947-50,
accommodates the delayed return to "free" financial markets
In 1951.

As might be expected, factors other than the yield

attractiveness of savings bonds must be relied upon to ex
plain the fluctuations in savings bond activities during
calendar years 1947-50.

TABLE 3-5.--Summary of the Savings Bond Program by Periods,
March 1, 1935 to December 31, 1963
(Millions of dollars)

Period

Origin, to
Apr. 30, 1941

Outstanding
savings bonds
(End of the
period)

3,647

Changes in
outstanding
savings bonds

+

Cumulative
net sales

3,647

+

3,489

Expansionary, to
Dec. 31, 1946

49,776

+ 46,129

+ 44,529

Postwar, to
Dec. 31, 1963

48,827

949

- 20,917

From the low level in 1946, combined net sales of sav
ings bonds Increased in 1947 and 1948, but declined precipi
tously thereafter.

(See Table 3-6 and Chart 3-1.)

Declining

TABLE 3-6.--Combined Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of Savings Bonds for Periods
of Years prior to 1947 and for each Year from 1947-63
(Millions of dollars)

Combined gross sales
x (2)
Calendar (Issue price)
Yearly
year
Cumulative

Combined redemptions^ ^
(Issue price plus.„\
accrued discount)' '
Yearly
j Cumulative

Combined
net sales

Proportion of redemp
tions to gross sales
(Per cent)
Yearly
Cumulative

___________ 1
______________
Periods of Years Prior to the Postwar Period

1935-40

----

3,449

1941-46

----

65,779

379
----

17,807

—

----

11

----

----

27

77
71
87
96
143
122
128
113

32
35
39
41
47
50
53
57

Postwar Period

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

6,694
7,295
5,833
6,074
3,961
4,161
4,800
6,173

72,473
79,768
85,602
91,675
95,638
99,799
104,499
110,772

5,126
5,144
5,101
5,840
5,651
5,074
6,149
6,985

22,933
28,077
33,178
38,018
44,670
49,744
55,893
62,878

1,568
2,151
732
234
-1,690
-913
-1,349
-812

TABLE 3-6 (cont.)

Combined gross sales
Calendar
year

/T
* N (2)
(Issue price)
Cumulative
Yearly

Combined redemptions^)
(Issue price plus .
accrued discount)
Cumulative
Yearly

Combined
net sales

Proportion of redemp
tions to gross sales
(Per cent)
Yearly j Cumulative
i

Postwar Period

7,301
8,264
9,630
7,255
8,772
6,732
5,595
5,602
5,021

70,179
78,444
88,074
95,329
104,101
110,833
116,428
122,030
127,051

-1,025
-2,747
-5,025
-2,566
-4,452
-2,382
-1,056
-1,324
-261

116
150
209
155
203
155
123
131
105

60
64
69
72
76
79
80
82
82

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

6,276
5,517
4,605
4,689
4,320
4,350
4,539
4,278
4,760

117,048
122,565
127,170
131,859
136,179
140,529
145,068
149,346
154,106

1947-63

--

--

—

--

-20,917

--

—

1947-50
1951-63

»_ _
———

__ _

•**
_ »—

.—
•"™

4,685
-25,602

--

—

»— —

Source.
Data for calendar years 1935-40, for 1941-46 and for 1947 from Treasury
Bulletin (March, 1948), p= 24; data for 1948 to 1952, ibid. . (December, 1953), p. 19;
data for 1953 to 1957, ibid , (December, 1958), p. 37; data for 1958 to 1963, ibid. ,
-‘December, 1964), p. 64

TABLE 3-6 (cont, )
Note: Net sales, cumulative gross sales, cumulative redemptions and percentages are
calculated from the original data; net sales are gross sales at issue price minus redemp
tions at issue price plus accrued discount.
(1)

Includes both matured and unmatured bonds until March, 1961.

(2) Sales and redemption figures include exchanges of minor amounts of (1) matured
series E bonds for series G and K bonds from May, 1951 through April, 1957 and (2) Series
F and G bonds for series H bonds beginning January, 1960; however, they exclude exchanges
of series E bonds for series H bonds.
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CHART 3-1.--Net Sales of Savings Bonds by Groups, 1946-63
3,000

2,000
1,000

»\ Group II bonds

Group I bonds

0

-3,000
-4,000
-5,000

Combined savings bonds
'58

61

1963

Calendar year
Source:
For combined savings bonds, Table 3-6; for
groups I and II bonds, Tables B-l and B-2 in Appendix B.
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21
redemptions, rather than rising gross sales,
offering of group II bonds in the latter year

plus a special
22

contributed

heavily to the rise in net sales in 19A7 and 19A8.
however, rising redemptions

23

By 19A9,

had drastically reversed this

early trend, although to some extent another special offering
of group II bonds

2A

moderated the decline in net sales in

1950.

21

Rising net sales of group I bonds provided for the
expansion of combined net sales of savings bonds early in
the period.
Unlike that for series A-D and group II bonds,
net sales of group I bonds expanded in each year except 1950
during calendar years 19A7-50.
In particular, this recovery
in net sales was concentrated in series E bonds in denomina
tions of $10 to $100.
See George Hanc, o£. cit., pp. 5A-55;
and Table B-l in Appendix B, for the net sales of group I
bonds.
^Finan c i a l institutions other than commercial banks were
permitted to purchase F and G bonds in amounts exceeding pre
vailing limits on annual purchases, and commercial banks were
also permitted to purchase limited amounts of these bonds.
In 1958, the Treasury sold over $1 billion of F and G bonds
to all investors in one month.
See George Hanc, o£. c i t . , p.
53.
^Redemptions of series A-D bonds increased significantly
after 19A8, as the pool of matured bonds, which had not been
granted an extended term to maturity option, increased.
From
$A82 million in 19A8, redemptions of series A-D bonds in
creased to $810 million in 19A9 and to $1,003 million in
1950.
In addition, increased redemptions of group I bonds in
1950 aggravated the decline in combined net sales of savings
bonds in that year.
Apparently, the decline in net sales of
group I bonds helped to finance the large scare purchases of
consumer goods which occurred at the outbreak of the Korean
War.
See George Hanc, 0 £. cit. , p. 53.
2A

In this special offering, the Treasury sold $930 mil
lion of F and G bonds under similar terms to those sold in
19A8.
(See Footnote 22.)
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As the monetary authorities adjusted slightly the sup
ported prices of short-term marketable government securities,
yields on all short-term assets, especially those offered
by private financial intermediaries, Increased.
II, Chart 2-1, p. 26.)

(See Chapter

For short- more than long-term

lenders, therefore, the yield attractiveness of savings
bonds vis-^-vis alternative investments declined.

Techni

cally, of course, this means that the opportunity costs of
purchasing a nonmarketable savings bond rather than a market
able government security and of holding a savings bond rather
than near moneys offered by financial intermediaries both in
creased while the opportunity cost of redeeming a savings bond
in order to purchase a marketable government security declined.
(See Chart 2-2.)

Furthermore, group II bonds, with a lower

yield schedule than that for group I bonds, were more vulnerable to small increases in competitive interest rates.

25

2S
Unlike the pattern for the net sales of group I bonds —
rising after 1946 but declining sharply in 1950--group II
bonds exhibited trends of declining gross sales other than in
years of special offerings and rising redemptions.
(See
Tables B-l and B-2 in Appendix B for the annual net sales of
group I and group II bonds, respectively.)
Perhaps, too, for
potential bondholders of group II more than for those of group
I, greater uncertainty in the financial markets, as a result
of the continued support of government security prices, pro
vided for more "wait and see" decisions; these actions, of
course, contributed to a reduction in the gross sales of sav
ings bonds, especially after the 1948-49 recession.
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Passive open-market operations designed to continue
the support of government security prices rendered monetary
policy largely ineffective in controlling inflation prior to
1948 and after mid-1950.

In depreciating the value of all

fixed claims, inflation therefore discouraged purchases of
savings bonds and encouraged the redemption of outstanding
bonds.^
Nevertheless, the savings bond program continued to be
an important instrument of Federal debt management through
out the first phase of the postwar period.

Relatively small,

but positive, combined net sales of savings bonds in each
year cumulatively expanded the Treasury's net cash receipts
by $4,685 million.

(See Table 3-6.)

These net sales plus

accrued discount on outstanding bonds increased the face
value of outstanding bonds to $58,019 million by the end
of 1950.

At this date, holdings of savings bonds represented

22.6 per cent of the national debt--the postwar summit in the
importance of savings bonds as a component of the national
debt.

(See Table 3-7.)

For group I bonds in particular, the urgent demand for
consumer goods, which inflamed the inflationary pressures,
likewise reduced the combined net sales of savings bonds.
In
addition, it should be noted, participating membership in pay
roll savings plans declined from 7.5 million in mid-1946 to
5.0 million in 1950.

TABLE 3-7.--Outstanding Savings Bonds by Groups of Bonds and Federal Gross Debt for
Selected Calendar Years prior to 1947 and for each Year 1947-63
(Millions of dollars)

Proportion of savings bonds outstanding
to outstanding Federal gross debt
Savings bonds outstanding
Calendar
year

Total

Group I

Group II

Federal
gross
debt

Total

(Per cent)
Group I

Group II

Selected Years prior to the Postwar Period

1941

6,140

1,134

1,390

58,020

10.6

2.0

2.4

1946

49,776

30,263

16,366

259,149

19.2

11.7

6.3

20.3
21.8
22.1
22.6
22.2
21.7
21.0
20.7

12.1
12.7
13.1
13.4
13.4
13.2
13.3
13.7

7.1
8.2
8.4
9.0
8.8
8.5
7.6
7.0

Postwar Period

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

52,053
55,051
56,707
58,019
57,587
57,940
57,710
57,672

30,997
32,188
33,766
34,493
34,727
35,324
36,663
38,233

18,314
20,613
21,501
23,089
22,859
22,616
21,047
19,439

256,900
252,800
257,130
256,708
259,419
267,391
275,168
278,750

TABLE 3-7 (cont.)

Proportion of savings bonds outstanding
to outstanding Federal gross debt
Savings bonds outstanding
Calendar
year

Total

Group I

Group II

Federal
gross
debt

Total

(Per cent)
Group I

Group II

Postwar Period

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

57,924
56,293
52,474
51,192
48,154
47,159
47,458
47,535
48,827

40,063
41,398
41,578
42,589
42,559
43,137
44,485
45,499
47,106

17,861
14,895
10,896
8,603
5,594
4,022
2,973
2,036
1,721

280,769
276,628
274,898
282,922
290,798
290,217
296,169
303,470
309,347

20.6
20.3
19.1
18.1
16.6
16.2
16.0
15.7
15.8

14.3
15.0
15.1
15.1
14.6
14.9
15.0
15.0
15.2

6.4
5.4
4.0
3.0
1.9
1.4

1.0
0.7

0.6

Source:
Savings bond data for 1941 to 1947 from Treasury Bulletin (March, 1948), pp.
24-26; data for 1948 to 1952, ibid., (December, 1953), pp. 19-20; data for 1953 to 1957,
ibid., (December, 1958), pp. 37-38; data for 1958 to 1963, ibid. , (December, 1964), pp.
64-65. Gross debt data obtained from each yearly issue of the Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury, 1942-1964.

TABLE 3-7 (cont. )
Note: Matured group II bonds outstanding are included in interest-bearing debt until
all bonds of the annual series have matured, and are then transferred to matured debt on
which interest has ceased.
Percentages are calculated.
(1)

Interest-bearing debt.

(2)

Gross debt outstanding excludes guaranteed securities issued by the Treasury.

oo
o
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A continuation of the precipitous decline in combined
net sales of savings bonds into 1951

27

marked the beginning

of successive annual cash drains for the Treasury during
calendar years 1951-63.

(See Table 3-6 and Chart 3-1.)

Furthermore, the cash drains were extremely large in 1956-57
and in 1959.
Immediately after the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord
on March 4, 1951, short-term rates of interest, which had
begun to rise slightly in the previous four years, continued
to rise, but at a more rapid pace, and the rigid ceiling on
long-term rates became permeable.

This rapid deterioration

in the yields of savings bonds relative to those on alterna
tive investments is clearly indicated, for example, by the
fact that the advantage in purchasing a new issue of group
II savings bonds (for its maturity yield) rather than a
long-term marketable government security had completely
vanished by the end of 1951.

The declining attractiveness

of savings bond yields was undoubtedly linked to the continued
decline in 1951 of combined net sales of savings bonds and the
occurrence of the first annual cash drain for the program of

27

The further decline in combined net sales in 1951, u n 
like those in 1949 and 1950, was not due to a rise in redemp
tions of maturing series A-D bonds.
In fact, redemptions de
creased from $1,003 million in 1950 to $436 million in 1951.
For the remainder of the second phase, redemptions of these
bonds were insignificant in that cumulative redemptions had
reduced the amount of outstanding A-D bonds to $152 million
by the end of 1951.
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$1,630 million in Chat same year.

28

The modest upward revision in yield structures in 1932

29

and the decline in marketable rates of interest during the
1953-54 recession temporarily restored, in part, the yield
attractiveness of savings bonds in comparison to alternative
investments.

Rapidly rising market rates of interest follow

ing this recession, however, quickly eliminated these tempo
rary boosts in, and reduced even further by 1957, the yield
attractiveness of savings bonds.

30

In turn, annual net sales

of groups I and II bonds declined drastically in 1956 and
1957, and produced a combined net cash drain for the Treasury

28

As might be expected from a rise in market rates of
interest, declining gross sales and rising redemptions of
groups I and II bonds took place in 1951.
(See Tables B-l
and B-2 in Appendix B.)
^ A s noted in the previous chapter, the Treasury modi
fied the savings bond program prior to changing its offer
ings of savings bonds in 1952.
This modification, of course,
was an attempt to avoid a continuing cash drain from redemp
tions of maturing series E bonds on and after May 1, 1951.
^ Y i e l d s on marketable government securities set new
postwar peaks in 1956 and 1957.
As a result, the average
annual yields on marketable government securities, with the
exception of the shortest term issues, exceeded the revised
(1952) maturity yield of 3.0 per cent on new issues of series
E bonds in 1956.
With the continued rise in the yields of
marketable government securities, even the average annual
yield on the shortest term issues exceeded the newly revised
(1957) maturity yield of 3.25 per cent on new issues of series
E bonds in 1957.

83

of $7,772 million in those two years alone.

Comparatively,

group II bonds, with their lower yield schedule than that of
group I bonds, were more sensitive to changes in market rates
of interest and their decline in net sales was greater than
that of group I bonds.

31

31

(See Tables B-l and B-2 in Appendix

Not only were the reductions in net sales during 1956
and 1957 greater than that for group I bonds, but the decline
in net sales of group II bonds actually began in 1955.
Fol
lowing the end of the rise in gross sales in 1954, gross
sales decreased and redemptions increased; apparently, bond
holders responded to some extent to the temporary increase in
the yields of savings bonds in comparison to alternative in
vestments during the 1953-54 recession.
Of course, redemp
tions of group II bonds, which carried no extended term to
maturity option, expanded from 1955 through 1957 as bonds
previously sold during calendar years 1943-45 were redeemed
at maturity.
Seemingly, funds obtained from these redemptions
were not reinvested in savings bonds.
Even if an extended
term to maturity option had been granted to these holders, it
is unlikely that redemptions of group II bonds would have
been significantly different. j j o v the period from 1955
through 1957, the net cash drain was $8,731 million^/
it
may be recalled that series J and K bonds were withdrawn
from the offerings of savings bonds during 1957.
In contrast to group II bonds, the declining net sales
of group I bonds in 1956 and 1957 were preceded by expanding
net sales, which began in 1953 in spite of rising redemp
tions.
Underlining these net sales of group I bonds from
1953 through 1957 were:
(1) the relative stability of par
ticipating members in payroll savings plans (approximately
8 million during the period from mid-1953 to mid-1957);
(2) an expanding pool of matured,
but interest bearing
bonds that were sold from 1943 through 1945; (3) the rela
tively mild 1953-54 recession; (4) the expansion of the
market for series E bonds and series E and H bonds, res
pectively, in 1954 and 1955; and (5) the deterioration of
the yields of savings bonds vis-lk-vis alternative invest
ments after the recession of 1953-54.
Part of the rise in net sales of group I bonds during
1953-54 may reflect the response of investors to the tempo
rary increases in the yields of these bonds in comparison
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B.)

As a result of this experience, the Treasury discontinued

its offering of group II bonds.

This action, of course,

marked the end of the Treasury's experimentation with savings
bonds designed especially for the needs of Investors of substantial means.

32

Similar to the previous sequence of events, the 1957
revision in yield structures followed by the 1957-58 reces
sion temporarily restored, in part, the yield attractiveness
of group I bonds vis-l-vis alternative investments.

The

restrictive monetary policy pursued soon after this reces
sion, however, rapidly tightened the financial markets, and,
as market rates of interest set new postwar peaks in 1959,

to alternative investments.
Part of the rise during
1954-55 may reflect the broadening of the market for series
E in 1954 and series E and H bonds in 1955, i.e., trustees
of employee savings plans became eligible series E bond
purchasers in 1954 and personal trust estates became eli
gible series E and H bond purchasers in 1955.
In part due
to decisions of bondholders not to accept the optional,
extended term to maturity, net sales were hampered by rising
redemptions from 1953 through 1955.
The deteriorated rela
tive yields of savings bonds by 1956 and 1957 evidently
reversed the expanding net sales to the extent that a net
cash drain of $962 million was experienced in 1957.
As in
the case for group II bonds, declining gross sales and ris
ing redemptions characterized the declining net sales during
1956 and 1957.
32

Later, in 1958, group I bonds were offered for sale
to all investors other than commercial banks, and maturing
series F and G bonds were made exchangeable for series E
and H bonds without regard to the annual limit imposed on
these bond purchases.
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the yield attractiveness of savings bonds in comparison to
alternative investments decreased appreciably.

In spite of

the unprecedented change in yield structures on group 1
bonds that was made in 1959, combined net sales of savings
bonds declined drastically

33

and produced a net cash drain

for the Treasury of $4,452 million.

A general shift to five

per cent marketable Treasury notes ("magic 5's") by individuals

34

and exchanges of group 11 bonds for marketable issues

undoubtedly aggravated the cash drain in 1959.

36

33

In part, the decline resulted from increased redemp
tions of matured bonds.
See George Hanc, oj>. cit. , Table
12, p. 59, and p. 64.
34

"The offering of five per cent four-year ten-month
notes in October 1959, was one of the few instances in
recent years of substantial purchases by individuals
of an offering of marketable Treasury securities.
Allotments to individuals (including partnerships and
personal trust accounts) of the 'magic fives' amounted
to $778 million of the total of $2,316 million issued.
Monthly data from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and
National Association of Mutual Savings Banks indicate
that savings inflow into savings and loan associations
and mutual savings banks was substantially lower in
October 1959 than in the corresponding period of the
preceding year.
Net sales of E and H bonds showed a
similar drop." George Hanc, o£. cit., p. 64.
■^In December 1959, exchanges of F and G bonds issued in
1948 for 4-3/4 per cent marketable notes of 1964 amounted to
$760 million.
See George Hanc, 0 £. cit., Table A-4, p. 108.
■^Following the marked decline in combined net sales of
savings bonds in 1959, the level of combined net sales has
risen in every calendar year, except 1962.
The net sales of
group II bonds, which consist of redemptions only since 1957,

35
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The negative combined net sales of savings bonds in each
calendar year from 1951 to 1963, appears to reflect both the
general reduction in the attractiveness of savings bonds
yields relative to those on alternative investments

and

the discontinuance of the sale of group II bonds in 1957.
During this period, the Treasury experienced a cumulative
net cash drain of $25,602 million and outstanding savings
bonds declined to $48,827 million by the end .of 1963.
Reflecting both its inability to restore the attractiveness
of savings bond yields due to the statutory interest rate
ceiling and a desire to keep the interest cost on the na
tional debt to a minimum, the Treasury turned increasingly
to the sale of marketable securities in financing its budge
tary deficits.

Therefore, the importance of savings bonds

are approaching the zero level; this level of net sales
should be achieved no later than 1969 since all group II
bonds will have matured by February, 1969.
On the other
hand, the net sales of group I bonds increased during the
1960-61 recession, as gross sales increased and redemp
tions declined.
(See Table B-l in Appendix B.) With the
more moderate rise in market rates of interest--in comparison
with the rapid rise of these rates after the 1957-58 reces
sion- -the slight decline in net sales of group I bonds in
calendar year 1962 was reversed by 1963.
In addition, the granting of the first extended term to
maturity option to holders of H bonds with issue dates from
June 1, 1952 - January 1, 1957 may have contributed to higher
net sales of group I bonds since 1959.
See Treasury Bulletin
(September, 1961), pp. A-3 through A-4 for this announcement,
and ibid. (October, 1961), pp. A-3 through A-5 for the sched
ules of redemption values and yields of the extended term to
maturity on these H bonds.
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as a component of the national debt declined.

In fact, the

$48,827 million of savings bonds outstanding by the end of
1963 represented only 15.8 per cent of the national debt.
As of that date, however, outstanding group 1 bonds of
$47,106 million were only slightly less than the amount of
all savings bonds outstanding ($48,183 million) at the end
of calendar year 1945.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEMAND FOR SAVINGS BONDS

The demand for any good is defined by a function re
lating the quantity of the good demanded per unit of time
(Dx ) to its various determinants.

By precedence, the ob

jective determinants are the price of the good (Px ) , the
prices of substitutes and/or complements (Py^,

' * *

Pv ), and income (Y); the subjective determinants are tastes
yn
or preferences (U) and expectations (E).
dx

- D ( Px ; py i ; Py 2 ; . . • Py n ;

y

Symbolically,
;

u

;

e ).

(4-1)

It seems feasible to analyze the demand for savings
bonds within the framework of traditional demand theory.
In using this framework, the major objective is to estimate
the demand for savings bonds, by groups, through the use of
regression analysis.
In attempting to use the orthodox concept of demand in
empirical research, the usefulness of the subjective deter
minants is normally highly limited.

With possibly the excep

tion of bond denomination, this is also the case for savings
bonds.

To the extent that the denomination of the savings

bond purchased depends upon the purchaser's taste or
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preference, a bond denomination variable appears to be a
desirable subjective determinant.

Unfortunately, savings

bond data by denominations for the entire postwar period
were not available to the author at the time of this study.^
Nevertheless, a bond-denomination-range parameter
emerges from separate analysis of groups I and II bonds.
(See Table 2-1.)

Since decisions to purchase and redeem

savings bonds of large denominations are likely to be made
on a more rational basis than are similar decisions for
small denominations, group analysis of savings bonds may
reasonably provide a practical substitute for a bond
denomination variable.

2

Alternative Dependent^ Variables
In proposing a concept of the demand for savings bonds,
several quantity variables might be considered as the d e 
pendent variable.

These possibilities and their relation

ships to each other are summarized in equations (4-2) and (4-3).

^An attempt was made to obtain savings bond data by
denominations for the years 1957-63 from the U.S. Department
of the Treasury.
Although the information was not obtained,
the files from which the data could be obtained appear to be
accessible for individual research.
With respect to bond denominations only, series H
bonds, which were offered in demonations of $500 or more,
would have been placed in group II rather than group I
bonds.
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^ O u t s t a n d i n g bonds - net sales + accrued
discount on outstand
ing discountappreciation securi
ties; and
Net sales - gross sales - redemptions.

(4-2)

3

(4-3)

Some of these possibilities can be eliminated rather
easily.

First, accrued discount on outstanding securities

is determined primarily by exogeneous factors, i.e., the
distribution of outstanding bonds by the length of time
they have been held and the schedules of yields applicable
4
to the outstanding savings bonds.

Therefore, accrued dis

count should be relatively stable except for the large
shift which occurred in 1959 when the schedule of yields
for all outstanding and new group 1 bonds was changed.
Clearly, accrued discount on outstanding savings bonds
should be eliminated as the dependent variable.
If gross sales and redemptions were independent of
each other, a highly sophisticated demand function for
savings bonds could be proposed.

This would involve the

3
Redemptions are defined to include accrued interest
on redeemed securities.
variety of schedules of yields for both groups of
bonds existed prior to the 1959 change in yield structure
for outstanding and new issues of group I bonds.
Since
then, however, a schedule of yields has applied to all
bonds in group I.
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difference between a function for gross sales and a func
tion for redemptions.

Considering both gross sales and

redemptions would be preferred to a single function for
either net sales or the change in outstanding bonds.

At

any given time, of course, decisions to purchase and deci
sions to redeem savings bonds are likely to be made by dif
ferent individuals.^

Furthermore, the motives in purchasing

and in redeeming savings bonds are likely to be different.

Objective determinants for net sales and the change
in outstanding bonds can not be defined easily.
Apparently,
composite determinants are required.
£
When savings bonds mature, the maturity value of each
bond may be reinvested in savings bonds during the same
period.
Except for this case, it seems highly unlikely
that decisions to purchase and to redeem savings bonds would
be made by the same individuals within a one year period of
time.
Although unavailable after fiscal year 1957, earlier
data on redemptions of savings bonds within one year after
the date of purchase indicated that such redemptions were
lower the larger the denomination.
For the $25 series E
bond, for example, 52 per cent of the bonds sold each year
from 1947 to 1957 were redeemed within a year after the
date of purchase; for the $500 series E bond, approximately
12 per cent of the bonds sold in this period were redeemed
within a year after their date of purchase.
See Annua1
Report of the Treasury, 1958, pp. 556-562.
Undoubtedly, this information is not sufficient to
provide a basis for assuming "independence” between deci
sions to purchase and redeem savings bonds unless the
Treasury depended primarily upon the sales of the larger
denominations in order to provide most of its funds raised
from the sale of savings bonds.
George Hanc indicated
that was the case until 1958 for both groups of bonds, but
especially for group II bonds.
See George Hanc, The United
States Savings Bond Program In The Postwar Period (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,1962), pp. 44-46,
and 55.
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In this sense, gross sales and redemptions may be somewhat
independent of each other.
Independence in this sense, however, is somewhat ir
relevant.

Theoretically, a rational decision to purchase a

savings bond can not be made without considering the terms
under which the security can be redeemed.

This would in

volve not only the yield for the expected holding period,
but also the yields if redemption were earlier or later
than originally anticipated.

In this sense, gross sales

and redemptions are not independent.
The critical criterion of independence lies with the
identification of the determinants.

Later, when the price

determinants of demand are defined, it will be clear that
the price variables for gross sales and redemptions possess
a considerable degree of interdependence.

This obvious lack

of independence between the functions for gross sales and
redemptions appears to limit thej.r usefulness.^
We are now left with either the change in outstanding
bonds or net sales as the dependent variable in our demand

7

On the other hand, these two variables are helpful
in formulating price concepts that are useful when con
sidering net sales as the dependent variable.
To some
extent, therefore, gross sales and redemptions may be
used as alternative dependent variables in order to check
the consistency of the results obtained with net sales.
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functions.

There really seems to be little reason to

choose one over the other, and the decision was made quite
arbitrarily.

Net sales was chosen since gross sales and

redemptions are helpful in formulating the concepts of the
price

of savings bonds.
The characteristics of savings bonds as financial

assets provide a basis for defining price determinants;
therefore, the next section is devoted to this topic.

Liquidity and Term to Maturity of Savings Bonds
The holder of money possesses the most liquid asset
available.

By holding an asset that is 100 per cent liquid,

the holders of money sacrifice the additional income that
is earned by lenders.

In order to receive the return that

is earned by lenders, the holders of money must depart with
their most liquid asset.

Unavoidably, in substituting some

other financial asset for money, some degrees of liquidity
are sacrificed.

Moving along a spectrum from the most

liquid to the least liquid asset, the substitution of higher
returns for degrees of liquidity can be envisioned.

8

Except for minor limitations, any savings bond can be
redeemed for the full amount of money originally invested,

fl

Beard, "Counter-Cyclical Debt Management--A Suggested
Interpretation," pp. 246-248.

94

plus some return.

A published redemption schedule Indicates

the exact return to be realized, depending upon the length
of time the bond is held.

As a nonmarketable security, a

savings bond protects its owner from any loss in value due
to a rise in the market rate of interest, i.e., it is devoid
of money risk.

As an obligation of the United States gov

ernment, a savings bond has minimum risk of default,
it is relatively free of credit risk.

i.e.,

All savings bonds,

whether of the discount-appreciation type--series E, F, and
J--or the current-income type--series H, G, and K--meet the
requirements of highly liquid assets.
Based on their terms to maturity, savings bonds could
be classified as long-term securities and holders of sav
ings bonds as long-term lenders.

On the other hand, since

savings bonds can be redeemed virtually at any time after
the bonds have been purchased, savings bonds could be clas
sified as very short-term securities or, in fact, any
length-of-term securities along the spectrum from shortto long-term issues.

In this case, the holders of savings

bonds could be considered short-term lenders or any lengthof-term lenders, depending upon the period of time savings
bonds are held.
The great liquidity of savings bonds and the various
possible classifications of bondholders permit a considerable
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range in defining the prices of savings bonds, their substi
tutes and complements.

Alternative Independent Determinants
The determinants of the demand for a good were itemized
in equation (4-1).

In adapting any financial asset to this

framework, proxy independent variables must be substituted
for the independent determinants.

Since no single proxy

variable appears to be adequate in providing a sufficient
independent determinant, perhaps several proxy variables can
be proposed for a single determinant.

Proxy Price Determinants
Theoretically, the demand for a good per unit of time
depends upon its price and the prices of its substitutes and
complements.

The inverse relationship between the price of

a good and its quantity demanded per unit of time is sum
marized by a demand schedule that is identified by parame
ters assumed to be held constant.

A change in the price

of a substitute or complementary good shifts the demand
schedule for the good in question.
crease)

With an increase (de

in the price of the substitute good, the quantity

of the good demanded increases (decreases) as the demand
schedule for the good shifts upward to the right (downward
to the left); with an increase (decrease) in the price of
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a complementary good, the quantity of the good demanded
decreases (Increases) as the demand schedule for the good
shifts downward to the left (upward to the right).
For financial assets, prices as opportunity costs appear
appropriate.

Therefore, the adaptation for savings bonds

might be in terms of appropriate yield differentials.
fortunately,

Un

this approach does not provide any prices of

substitutes and complements.

On the other hand, several

prices of savings bonds can be defined.

Purchasers' Price of Savings Bonds (Cj^ j)
With the variety of alternative liquid assets that
are available to potential purchasers of savings bonds,
many concepts of opportunity cost are possible.

One pos

sible proxy for price is the opportunity cost of acquiring
savings bonds rather than a marketable government security.
While a variety of time-holding-periods could be considered
in measuring this opportunity cost, each possible yield dif
ferential would indicate the value that rational purchasers
attach to the absence of money risk on a nonmarketable savings bond.
q

These yield differentials, of course, would not

Three continuous series of average yields on market
able government securities are published in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin; these are average yields on short-term
(9-12 months) issues, intermediate-term (3-5 years) obli
gations, and long-term (ten years or more) securities.

97
measure the difference in credit risks assumed by the lenders
since both types of assets are government liabilities.

For

the remainder of this study, this concept of the purchasers'
price of savings bonds will be referred to as the "oppor
tunity cost of purchasing a nonmarketable government security"
(CNM> *
In the previous section some doubt was raised as to
whether the purchasers of savings bonds are primarily
lenders in the money market (short-term) or lenders in the
capital market (long-term).

One of the objectives of the

savings bond program since its beginning has been to dis
courage the (ex-ante) short-term lenders by adopting low
rates of return for early redemptions.

Although the sched

ules of yields for early redemptions were raised in 1952,
1957, and 1959, the Treasury's objective of discouraging
(ex-ante) short-term lenders has not been discarded.

The

yield realized if redemption occurs prior to maturity has

10
remained consistently lower than the maturity yield.

Since yield differentials between marketable government se
curities and savings bonds are to be measured quantitatively,
the various measurements of the price of savings bonds are
limited to comparable time-holding-periods allowed by these
three series of marketable government securities,
^ P r e s u m a b l y , the schedules of yields have been changed
to make savings bonds more attractive to (ex-ante) long-term
lenders, who unexpectedly become (ex-post) short-term lenders.
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If savings bond purchasers are primarily long-term
lenders,

could be measured by the differential between

the average return on long-term marketable government se
curities (with a term to maturity equal to that of the
savings bond) and the maturity yield on the savings bonds.
On the other hand, the differential between the average
return on short-term marketable government issues and the
yield (for a comparable time-holding-period) on savings
bonds could be used to measure Cj^ for short-term lenders.
These two measures, however, are certainly not exhaustive.
It is possible, but perhaps unlikely, that the changes in
the schedules of yields during the postwar period have at
tracted (ex-ante) short-term lenders to savings bonds.
Moreover,

the widely publicized maturity yields on savings

bonds may have attracted unsophisticated lenders.
reasons,

For these

could be measured by the differential between

the average return on short-term marketable government
issues and the maturity yield on savings bonds.
these possible measures of

Each of

appears to be worthy of some

consideration.
In summary, the following measures of

for each

group of bonds during the postwar period are p r o p o s e d : ^

^ F o r group I bonds, the yield on savings bonds is
measured by the yields on new issues of series E bonds only;
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^NM

Cm

“ t^le °PPort:unity cost of purchasing a nonmarketable government security for group I
(series E and H) bonds.
■ the opportunity cost of purchasing a nonJ
marketable government security for group II
(series F, G, J, and K) bonds.

^NM
or ^NMo
"“ 11
*1

" t*ie
ferential between the average
yield on long-term marketable govern
ment securities and the maturity yield
on savings bonds.

cNMi o or CNM
1
*2

" the differential between the average
yield on short-term marketable govern
ment securities and the maturity yield
on savings bonds.

c n m 13

or

c n m 23

the differential between the average
yield on short-term marketable govern
ment securities and the yield on
savings bonds held for a time-holdingperiod of one year.

Regardless of which yield differential is the best
measure of Cj^, theoretically this opportunity cost should
be inversely related to gross sales.

As the average yield

on marketable government obligations rises relative to the
yield on savings bonds, the purchasers of savings bonds
forego the higher return on the marketable issues, i.e.,

for group II bonds, new issues of series F and J bonds.
For marketable government securities, the average yield
on long-term securities is measured by the average annual
yields on marketable government securities with terms to
maturity of ten years or more; the average annual yield on
short-term marketable government securities is measured by
the average annual yields on marketable issues with terms
to maturity of 9-12 months.
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rises.

A relative rise in the return on marketable

issues, therefore, should be associated with a decline in
the net sales of savings bonds.

Redeemers1 Price of Savings Bonds (Cr )
Once the minimal time period during which savings bonds
can not be redeemed has elapsed, holders of savings bonds
can choose to re-evaluate their asset portfolios in deciding
whether to redeem or continue to hold these issues.
ing this decision,

In mak

the alternative use of the funds to be

obtained if a savings bond is redeemed is obviously a stra
tegic factor.

If the potential redeemers1 price of a sav

ings bond is defined as the price of redeeming a savings
bond in order to purchase a marketable government security,
this opportunity cost provides another proxy variable for the
price of savings bonds.

This concept of the r e d e e m e r s price

of a savings bond will be referred to as the "opportunity
cost of redeeming a savings bond before its maturity in order
to purchase a marketable government security"

(Cr )

.

When the

prospective yield to maturity on a savings bond rises rela
tive to the average yield on comparable marketable govern
ment issues,

rises.

A rise in C^, therefore, should in

duce a decline in redemptions.

Thus, a rise in

associated with an increase in net sales.

should be
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If average life data for savings bonds were available,
an approximation of

could be obtained by anchoring the

prospective yield to maturity to a time-holding-period equal
to the average life of the bonds In each group.

Unfortunately,

this approach, while sound In principle, had to be discarded
because of the absence of sufficiently detailed data.

Some

other method had to be employed in obtaining an estimate of
the time-holding-period.
Because of the inappropriateness of both long-term and
short-term yields,

it appears that the average yields on

intermediate-term (3-5 years) marketable government securi
ties might be the most appropriate yield series for measuring
during the postwar period for both group I and group II
bonds.

12

With this as a starting point, the time-holding-

period range for each group of bonds is defined as the dif
ference between the original term to maturity of savings
bonds and the term to maturity (3-5 years) of intermediateterm marketable government securities.

12

From these time-

Clearly, both short-term and long-term marketable
government security yields are less appropriate.
In the
former case, the assumption would be made that savings
bonds with an original maturity of ten years, for example,
are redeemed roughly one year prior to maturity; in the
latter case, the original term to maturity of the savings
bond is equal to or less than the average term to maturity
of long-term (ten years or more) marketable government
securities.
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holding-period ranges, a constant time-holding-period of
five years for group I bonds and seven years for group II
bonds appears appropriate.^
In summary, the following measure of

for each group

of bonds Is proposed:
- the opportunity cost of redeeming group I bonds
1
before maturity In order to purchase a market
able government security, which is equal to the
differential between the prospective yield on
new issues of savings bonds held to maturity
rather than redeemed at the end of a timeholding period of five years and the average
yield on intermediate-term (3-5 years) market
able government securities.14
CR
2

- the opportunity cost of redeeming group II bonds
before maturity in order to purchase a market
able government security, which is equal to the
differential between the prospective yield on
new issues of savings bonds held to maturity
rather than redeemed at the end of a time-holdingperiod of seven years and the average yield on

13

The original term to maturity of series E bonds was
reduced from ten years in 1947 to seven years nine months by
1963.
Thus, the valid time-holding-period ranges for these
bonds were seven to five years in 1947 and five to three
years by 1963.
To some extent, the seven-year time-holdingperiod for group II bonds is approximated in the same manner.
With the discontinuance of the sales of group II bonds in
1957, however, all of these bonds outstanding by 1964 would
have been held longer than seven years.
The minimum timeholding-period that could be assumed for the postwar period,
therefore, appeared to be seven years.
14

For group I bonds, the prospective yield to maturity
on savings bonds is measured by prospective yields on new
issues of series E bends only.
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Intermediate-term (3-5 years) marketable govern
ment securities.15

An Alternative Price of Savings Bonds (Cgj))
As compared with marketable government securities, near
moneys offered by financial intermediaries may represent
even closer substitutes for savings bonds.

Certainly, po

tential purchasers and redeemers of savings bonds may con
sider carefully such alternatives as time deposits and sav
ings and loan shares, for example.

Such assets possess many

of the same characteristics as savings bonds.

Because of

the large number of highly liquid financial assets offered
by financial intermediaries, it would be possible to define
a whole family of opportunity cost concepts.

Yet, potential

holders of savings bonds do not consider all of the numerous
outlets that bid for the savings of individuals if for no
other reason than the fact that every community does not
possess every type of savings outlet.

Rather than selecting

one near money to represent all of the numerous possibilities,
a hypothetical composite savings deposit for individuals is
calculated.

This composite savings deposit includes shares

in savings and loan associations and credit unions, savings

^ F o r group II bonds, the prospective yield to maturity
on savings bonds is measured by prospective yields on new
issues of series F and J bonds only.
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and time deposits in commercial banks and mutual savings
banks, and postal savings deposits.

It is felt that the

composite savings deposit provides a better single proxy
variable than would be provided by any one of the near
moneys alone.

(See the note to Chart 2-2-B in Chapter 11.)

Therefore, another concept of the price of savings bonds
that will be utilized is the opportunity cost of holding
savings bonds rather than a composite savings deposit.

16

For convenience, this price concept will be referred to
as the "opportunity cost of holding a composite savings
deposit" (CgD) .
Perhaps the best way of measuring CSD is to take the
differential between the average yield on the composite
savings deposit and the yield on savings bonds held for a
time-holding-period equal to the reciprocal of the average
annual turnover rate of the composite savings d e p o s i t . ^

16

As was the case with C ^ and Cr previously, a lack of
statistical independence between two price concepts for near
moneys would undoubtedly arise if a differentiation were
made between the purchasers' and the redeemers' points of
view.
Although either of the viewpoints could be used, the
simpler of the two is chosen.
17

Theoretically, Cgp could be measured by the differen
tial between the average yield on the composite savings de
posit and the yield on savings bonds for a time-holdingperiod equal to the average life of the bonds.
But, as pre
viously mentioned, this information is not available for both
groups of bonds.
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A rough approximation of the annual turnover rate of the
composite savings deposit is provided by the following data
collected by George Hanc.

He found that the ranges of the

annual turnover rates from 1948-60 for savings deposits were
0.45 to 0.49 for commercial banks, 0.25 to 0.28 for mutual
savings banks, and 0.25 to 0.30 for savings and loan asso
ciations.^®

Based on this data, it would seem reasonable

to assume a three-year time-holding-period for the compos
ite savings deposit.

While such a time-holding-period can

be used for group I bonds, a uniform, three-year timeholding-period for group II bonds does not appear to be
strictly applicable due to the discontinuance of the sales
of series J and K bonds in April,
ever,

1957.

It appears, how

that a three-year time-holding-period can be used for

the years from 1947-57; beginning in 1958 and for each year
thereafter, a corresponding time-holding-period one-year
longer than that of the preceding year might be used.
a result of this approximation,

As

the time-holding-periods

would range from four years in 1958 to nine years in 1963.
In summary, the following measure of CgD f°r each group
of bonds is proposed:

*-®George Hanc, o£. cit. , p. 75.
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Cgo
1

Cgo
2

* the opportunity cost of holding a composite
savings deposit for group I bonds, which is
equal to the differential between the average
yield on a composite savings deposit and the
yield on savings bonds held for a time-holdingperiod of three years.19
■ the opportunity cost of holding a composite
savings deposit for group II bonds, which is
equal to the differential between the average
yield on a composite savings deposit and the
yield on savings bonds held for a time-holdingperiod of three years for the years 1947-57
and for 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 years, respectively,
for the years from 1 9 5 8 - 6 3 . 2 0

The Proxy Income Determinant (Y)
An individual's demand for a normal good increases
(decreases) as his income rises (falls).

In terms of a

demand schedule, an increase in income shifts the demand
schedule for the good upward to the right, i.e., at each
price of the good a larger quantity is demanded per unit
of time after the rise in income.

In the case of an

inferior good, an increase in income decreases the quantity
demanded at each price.

19

For group I bonds,
measured by the yields on
For the composite savings
measured by the effective
(See Chart 2-1, notes.)
20

the yield on savings bonds is
new issues of series E bonds only.
deposit, the average yield is
yield paid to deposit holders.

For group II bonds, the yield on savings bonds is
measured by the yields on new issues of F or J bonds.
For
both groups of bonds, the average yield on the composite
savings deposit is identical.
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The distribution of income as well as its level may be
a determinant of the market demand for a good.

Thus, at

least one additional variable representing the distribution
of income may be required in explaining the effect of changes
in income on demand.

This may apply to savings bonds also.

The availability of national Income data and the lack
of income data for actual purchasers of savings bonds sug
gest that national income might be a suitable proxy variable
for the level of income.

Since one of the limitations placed

on the purchasers of group I bonds until 1954 was that the
purchaser must be a ’'natural person," disposable income
appears to be the most appropriate income concept.

If money,

rather than real, income is used however, it appears that
the purchasing power of the dollar should be considered as
an additional independent variable.

Even with real income,

it is possible that a price index or a purchasing-powerof-the-dollar variable should be considered as an additional
independent variable since savings bonds are fixed claims.
The depreciation (appreciation) of fixed claims in infla
tionary (deflationary) periods has long been recognized.
Although real income is utilized, an additional price in
dex variable is excluded since it is anticipated that such
a variable would not be significant according to quantita
tive testing.
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On the other hand, a bond denomination variable would
probably provide information about the distribution of in
come among purchasers of savings bonds, even though small
21
denominations can be exchanged for larger denominations.
Although a bond denomination variable can not be included
within the demand function because the necessary data are
not available, separate analysis of groups I and II bonds
are to be undertaken; to some extent, this compensates for
the lack of a bond denomination variable, at least for
group II bonds.

22

With respect to savings bonds, it appears that a real
saving, rather than a real income, variable might be a
better estimator of the income determinant.

In this study,

therefore, real income and saving are treated as mutually
exclusive economic variables,

i.e., either one, but not

both, can be referred to as a measure of the income

21

To some extent the denomination of the savings bond
purchased may reflect the taste or preference of the pur
chaser.
More often, however, the level of income of the
purchaser probably determines the selection of a denomina
tion.
With an anticipated direct relationship between the
level of income and the denomination, a bond denomination
variable in addition to an income variable should provide
a sufficient proxy income determinant in that the effects
of income and its distribution would be approximated.
22

Clearly, large denominations of savings bonds per
vaded group II bond purchases whereas small denominations
have been most important for group I bond purchases.
(See,
p. 89.)
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determinant.

In addition, real saving and income variables

could be considered in total (real) dollar amounts or de
flated by population changes to yield per-capita figures.
In summary, any of the following proxy variables could
be considered as a measure of the level of the income deter
minant:
DI - Real disposable income.
DI/p - Per capita real disposable income.
PS - Real personal savings.
23
PS/p • Per capita real personal savings.

An Additional Proxy Income Variable (AY)
It is not anticipated that any of the proposed measures
of the income variable will be an adequate income determi
nant.

To some extent, the empirical results for the income

determinant could be improved if the single income variables

To avoid any spurious correlation due to the secular
trend within each of these aggregate measures, it appears
that the secular trend should be removed in each case before
correlation analysis is attempted.
In order to do this, the
data for each year are expressed as a proportion of their
corresponding secular trend value.
In removing secular trend
from an independent variable, however, the effect that the
absolute level of the independent variable could have on the
dependent variable is eliminated.
That is, only the effect
that the fluctuations of the independent variable might have
on the dependent variable can be measured.
In each year DI is measured as a proportion of its
linear secular trend value; DI/p, PS, and PS/p, as a pro
portion of their corresponding parabolic trend value.
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were combined with an additional income variable.

In par

ticular, certain combinations of the proposed income meas
ures with consumer durable expenditures, gross financial
savings by individuals and/or net additions to savings
accounts by individuals may be worthy substitutes for the
single income m e a s u r e s . ^
When the proxy income variable is either PS or PS/p,
for example, similar variants of consumer durable expendi
tures may be the appropriate additional income variable.
If savings bonds are purchased as a means of saving for
planned future purchases of durable goods, a rise in con
sumer durable expenditures should be associated with a
decline in net sales, as savings bonds are redeemed in
order to finance the purchase.

If purchases of durable

goods cause a postponement in purchasing savings bonds, a
rise in consumer durable expenditures should be associated
with a decline in net sales also.

In the latter case,

however, the decline in gross sales of savings bonds
contributes to the decline in net sales.

In summary, the

proposed measures of the additional income variable are:

0/

George Hanc (op. cit., pp. 48-65) relied upon these
variables in analyzing the quarterly fluctuations in the
net sales of savings bonds during the Korean War.

Ill

CDE ■ Real consumer durable expenditures.
CDE/p - Per capita real consumer durable expenditures.

25

On the other hand, when the proxy income variable is
either DI or DI/p, either gross financial savings or net
additions to savings accounts by individuals will be used
as the additional income variables.

In referring to these

variables, the following symbols will be used.
GFS - Gross financial savings by individuals.
NAS - Net additions to savings accounts by individuals.

26

Summary
With net sales as the dependent variable, the two
groups of bonds during the postwar period are to be analyzed

Similar to the treatment of DI, DI/p, PS and PS/p,
the secular trend in each of these variables is removed by
measuring the variable in each year as a proportion of its
secular trend value.
Both CDE and CDE/p appeared to exhibit
linear secular trends during the postwar period.
^ U n l e s s the tests of DI/p, PS/p, and CDE/p indicate
that the per capita adjustment of a variable is preferred,
this variation for GFS and NAS will be ignored.
This ap
proach has been selected in order to limit the possible
measures of the additional income variable to a reasonable
number.
A parabolic function appears to be appropriate in meas
uring the secular trend for both GFS and NAS.
The tremendous
growth of each series during the postwar period, however,
distorts the measurements of the proportion of secular trend
value.
As a substitute, therefore, the secular trends for
GFS and NAS are removed, in part, by calculating the absolute
deviations of the original data from their computed secular
trend values.
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within a framework similar to that for the demand for any
good.

Symbolically, the proposed net sales function is:

Dx - D (C^,; CR ; C SD; Y; AY).

Several measures of
however.

(4-4)

Y, and AY have been proposed,

In the next chapter, estimates of the demand for

both group I and group II bonds are attempted.

CHAPTER V

SINGLE AND MULTIPLE DETERMINANT ESTIMATES OF THE DEMAND
FOR SAVINGS BONDS BY GROUPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1947-63

Estimates of the demand for group I and group II bonds
are derived for the postwar period, calendar years 1947-63.
In utilizing the least squares method of deriving time
series regressions, a "normal" time period had to be se
lected.

Since the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord did not

occur until March 4, 1951, perhaps a case could be made for
limiting the estimates of the demand functions to the sec
ond phase of the postwar period--after the return to "free"
financial markets.

If the time period were limited only to

the second phase, however, the derived demand functions would
be based on a very short time period since only annual data
are available for many of the proposed non-price variables.
For this reason, the longer period was selected.
Two types of demand functions can be derived--single
determinant estimates and multiple determinant estimates.
Although the latter are preferred, the former could provide
some information in selecting possible multiple determinants
and in interpreting their results.
therefore, are undertaken.
113

Both types of estimates,
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In order to determine whether a proxy Independent
variable is significant, the F-test is conducted at the
95 per cent level of confidence.

Single Determinant Estimates of the Demand
for Savings Bonds by Groups
For each group of bonds, a regression for annual net
sales with each proxy independent variable was undertaken.
The calculated coefficients of correlation for these re
gressions are summarized in Table 5-1.

As can be seen,

the highest coefficients are generally associated with the
various measures of Cj^ and with C^.

The significant re

gression equations and corresponding standard errors of
the estimate are shown in Table 5-2.

TABLE 5-1.--Simple Coefficient of Correlation (R) between
Annual Net Sales and each Independent Variable for
Group I and Group II Bonds, 1947-63

Independent
variable

Group I bonds
(R)

c N M 13

-0.645

cn m 12

-0.635
-0.521

Group II bonds
(R)
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Table 5-1 (cont.)

Independent
variable

Group I bends
(R)

Group II bonds
(R)

(1)

CNM23

-0.778

^NM22

-0.727

c n m 21

+0.462
Cr

i

+0.752

cr 2

C SD1

+0.024
-0,280

csd2

PS

-0.230

-0.026

PS/p

-0.214

+0.001

CDE

-0.146

+0.047

CDE/p

+0.105

-0.100

DI

-0.067

+0.308

DI/p

-0.226

-0.267

GFS

+0.005

-0.020

NAS

+0.219

-0.005

(1) Not applicable for the time period, calendar
years 1947-63.
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TABLE 5-2.••Significant Simple Regression Equations and Stand
ard Errors of Estimate (sg) for Group I and Group II
Bonds from 1947-63

Regression equations

SE

(Millions of dollars)

Annual net sales of group I bonds
+315 - 628.0
-554 - 474.9

c n m 13

•

463

•

468

•

517

c n m 12

-178 - 826.3 CN M 1^

Annual net sales of group II b o n d s ^ ^ -1,489 - 1,283.7
-230 - 1,646. 9
+1,726 + 1,328. 2

c n m 21
cr

2

.

1,334

•

1,528
1,215

•

(1) Annual net sales are in millions of dollars;

cNM1j * CNM2j » and CR2 * in per Cent: ^tW° declmals)*

The "Opportunity Cost of Purchasing a
Nonmarketable Government Security" ( C ^ )
The anticipated inverse relationship between net sales
and C jjh was confirmed in all cases.

Every

and

tested was significant in accounting for the fluctuations
in the annual net sales of groups I and II bonds.
Table 5-2.)

(See

Thus, the price concept of the "opportunity
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cost of purchasing a nonmarketable government security"
(Cn m ) appears to be a determinant of annual net sales.
Both the largest coefficient of correlation and the
smallest standard error of the estimate may be used in
selecting the best

estimator of annual net sales.

group I bonds, this is ^ N M ^ *

For

It Is to be recalled that

*s measured by the differential between

th&

average

return on short-term (9-12 months) marketable government
securities and the yield on new issues of series E bonds
held for a time-holding-period of one year.

Furthermore,

as this yield differential exceeds +0.50 percentage points,
negative annual

net sales can be expected (19 times out

20).

II bonds, on the other hand, the best esti

For group

mator of annual

net sales is

turity yield on

group II bonds would have had to exceed

of

*n t*1*8 case, the m a 
the

average yield on short-term marketable government securities
by more than 1.16 percentage points in order to avoid nega
tive annual net sales.

This greater interest-rate sensitiv

ity among group II bondholders than among group I holders

A regression for annual net sales with 0 1 ^ 2 3 was not
considered appropriate and thus was not undertaken.
With
the discontinuance of gross sales early in 1957, this
regression to a large extent would have measured the inter
relationship between redemptions and a purchaser's price of
savings bonds.
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tends to point out the Treasury's rationale for dropping the
sale of J and K bonds early in 1957.

2

The "Opportunity Cost of Redeeming a Savings Bond
before its Maturity in order to Purchase a
Marketable Government Security" (CR)
The anticipated positive relationship between annual
net sales and CR was confirmed in both cases (Table 5-1).
For group 1 bonds, however, the relationship was not sig
nificant.

It is to be recalled that CR ^ measures the dif

ferential between the prospective yield on new issues of
E bonds held to maturity rather than redeemed at a timeholding-period of five years and the average yield on
intermediate-term (3-5 years) marketable government securi
ties.

To the extent that the net sales of group I bonds

included redemptions of matured E bonds during their ex
tended terms, the prospective yield to maturity on new
issues was perhaps an inappropriate measure.
The relationship between annual net sales of group II
bonds and

2

however, was significant.

The regression

The price concept of Cjjm is based on the purchaser's
point of view.
As such,
should be a determinant of
gross sales as well as net sales.
This proposition--which
brings forth somewhat contradictory, but interesting, results--is tested and discussed briefly in Appendix C. As
mentioned earlier, however, these tests are subject to
severe limitations due to a lack of independence which
arises between the various prices of savings bonds.
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equation is shown in Table 5-2.

Empirically, the prospective

yield on new issues of F and J bonds held to maturity rather
than redeemed at a time-holding-period of seven years would
have had to exceed the average yield on intermediate-term
marketable government securities by 1.30 percentage points
in order to avoid negative annual net sales.

3

Again, these results Indicate a somewhat greater
interest-rate sensitivity among group II bondholders than
among holders of group I bonds.

With no option for an ex

tended term available for group II bonds, perhaps C r is a
more appropriate concept in this case than it is for group
I bonds.
An anticipated lack of independence between the prices
of savings bonds was called to the attention of the reader
when gross sales and redemptions were eliminated as the
dependent variables of the demand functions.

Surely the

high degree of correlation between each measure of

and

CR for each group of bonds indicates that independent func
tions for gross sales and redemptions could not have been

o

The consistency of the results for net sales with
was considered in Appendix C by analyzing the relationships
between
and gross sales.
As mentioned earlier, however,
these tests are subject to severe limitations.
But, in a
similar fashion, it is interesting to analyze the relation
ships between C r and redemptions.
For this side study, see
Appendix C.
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obtained.

4

(See Table 5-3.)

For the same reason, an

independent multiple determinant net sales function can not
be obtained unless either
proxy independent variable.

or

alone is chosen as a

Yet, with respect to net

sales as the dependent variable, neither C^| nor
appears to be a sufficient proxy variable.

alone

Logically, it

appears that Cj^ and CR should be combined into a single
(composite) proxy variable.

However, the problem of

assessing relative weights to

and

for the period

from 1947 to 1963 for group I bonds and from 1947 to 1957
for group II could not be resolved.
therefore, both price concepts of

As an alternative,
and CR --in spite of

their lack of independence--will be considered, later in
the chapter, as possible prices of savings bonds in the
multiple determinant analysis of net sales.

^Since the differentiation between viewpoints for pur
chasers and redeemers can not provide independent prices of
savings bonds, regressions for gross sales and redemptions
have limited validity in testing the consistency of the
results for net sales and were therefore omitted in the
text.
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TABLE 5-3.--The Simple Coefficient of Correlation between
each Cjq^ and C^ for each Group of Bonds, 1947-63

Group I bonds

Group II bonds

cNMij with cRi

CNM2j

c NM13

-0.526

c n h 12

“°-899

c n m 22

CNM u

-0.983

c NM21

CNM23

with C r 2

(1)
-0.958
-0.954

(1) Not applicable from 1947-63.

The "Opportunity Cost of Holding a
Composite Savings Deposit" (Cgj))
The anticipated inverse relationship between annual net
sales and Cgjj was confirmed for group II bonds, but not for
group I bonds.^
significant.

(See Table 5-1.)

In neither case was C SD

Perhaps these results are not surprising,

The unexpected relationship for group I bonds can not
be explained.
However, a simple regression for annual gross
sales with CgQ. was undertaken.
The anticipated negative
relationship was obtained, but the relationship was not
significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence.
The
relationship between redemptions and Cgj). was not investi
gated even though the analysis of net sales and gross sales
(redemptions) with C ^ (Cr ) indicated that little reliance
could be placed on the differentiation between the purchasers'
and redeemers' prices of savings bonds.
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since the calculated yields on the composite savings deposit
during the postwar period exhibited very little cyclical
fluctuations around their rising trend.

(See Chart 2-1.)

Regardless of these results, Cgp may still be considered
a price determinant in a multiple determinant analysis of
net sales.

Even with some probable lack of independence

between C ^ ,

CR , and CgD , these three prices, taken as a

group, may be good empirical proxies for the price
savings bonds.

of

In deriving the multiple determinant esti

mates of the demand for savings bonds, therefore, all three
of these prices of savings bonds will be considered pos
sible independent variables.

The Proxy Income Determinant
The results of the regressions indicated an inverse
relationship between annual net sales of group I bonds
a n d each of the four measures of the proxy income determinant--PS, PS/p, DI, and DI/p.

(See Table 5-1.)

Since

none of these measures were significant by the F test in
accounting for the fluctuations in annual net sales, only
the consistency of the indicated inverse relationship might
be noted.

For group II bonds, the relationships between

net sales and these four measures of the income determinant
were negative only with PS and DI.

Similar to the results

for group I bonds, PS, PS/p, DI, and DI/p were not
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significant as single determinants of net sales.
In addition to the yield attractiveness of savings
bonds relative to alternative investments, income or saving
was undoubtedly an important determinant of the demand for
savings bonds during the Second World War; since then, how
ever, interest rate differentials appear to be more import
ant than income or saving in explaining the demand for
savings bonds, especially for group II.

That is, no proxy

income variable was found to be a single determinant of net
sales, but

for group I and both

an<* CR 2 ^or

group II were significant single determinants of net sales.
Furthermore,

income or saving in comparison to interest

rate differentials has perhaps become less important in
explaining the demand for group I bonds since fluctuations
in redemptions of E bonds (by denomination within a year
from their date of purchase) indicate the same observation
for E bonds.

(See Chart 5-1.)

For example, early redemp

tions of E bonds within a year from the issue date exceeded
45 per cent of the $25 bonds sold and 35 per cent of the
$50 bonds sold.

If the basic operation of the payroll sav

ings plan is reflected by these

activities in small denomi

nations of E bonds, it might also be added, the effect that
systematic purchases of E bonds through the plan had on the
level of total saving was reduced considerably.
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CHART 5-1.--Percentage of E Bonds Redeemed Within One
Year After Issue Date, by Selected Denominations, 1941-58
Per cent

55
$25
50
45
$50
40
35
30

Total

/

25

y $ioo

20
15

$1,000

10
5

1941

'44

'47

'50

*53

'56

1958

Calendar years, 1941-58
Note:
Data are proportions of the value of bonds
originally sold in indicated calendar years which were
redeemed (including redemptions of bonds reissued as a
result of partial redemptions) before July 1 of the next
calendar year.
Sales and redemptions are taken at maturity
values.
Data are from Annual Report of the Treasury. 1959.
pp. 542-546.
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An Additional Proxy Income Variable
The additional income variable also appears to be inadequate as a single determinant of net sales for both
groups of bonds.

(See Table 5-1.)

For group I bonds,

positive relationships between net sales and CDE/p, GFS,
and NAS were obtained; with CDE, an Inverse relationship
was obtained.

For group II bonds, the positive and nega

tive relationships in each case were opposite to those ob
tained for group I bonds.
Unfortunately, the method by which both the income and
the additional income variables were measured obscures the
economic significance of the results.

Nevertheless, in a

multiple determinant analysis of the demand for savings
bonds by groups, all of the measures of the income and the
additional income variables will be considered as possible
independent variables.

Multiple Determinant Estimates of the
Demand for Savings Bonds by Groups
The proposed demand function for savings bonds was
summarized in equation (4-4).

With five proxy independent

variables in each demand function, a total of twenty-four
regressions were required in order to estimate the demand
functions for group I bonds; for group II bonds, only sixteen
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regressions were required.**

Estimates of the Demand for Group I Bonds
The results of the simple regressions for annual net
sales indicated that only the relationships derived from the
"opportunity cost of purchasing a nonmarketable government
security" ( C ^ ) were significant for group I bonds.

Each

of the three measures was an apparent determinant of annual
net sales during the postwar period.

The multiple deter

minant regressions undertaken indicated that none of the
other proxy independent variables could significantly aid
any

in accounting for the fluctuations in net sales.

That is, none of the measures of C r ^, Cgj)^, the proxy in
come determinant, or the additional income variable were
significant as a second independent variable in the multiple
determinant analysis.

Moreover, no

, as the second

independent variable, could significantly aid any of these
other variables in their role as the first independent
variable.
Therefore,

appears to be the only apparent deter

minant of the net sales of group I bonds.

While any of the

Of course, all of the permutations of the required 40
combinations of five independent variables in each regres
sion for both groups of bonds were considered also.
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three measures of

could be used, the best estimate of

net sales appears to be with Cj^j^^--the differential between
the average return on short-term (9-12 months) marketable
government securities and the yield on new issues of E
bonds held for a time-holding-period of one year.

The use

of this measure yields a coefficient of correlation of
-0.645 and a standard error of the estimate of $463 (mil
lions); the regression equation can be written as:
7
Annual net sales, 1947-63 - 315 - 628.0

(5-4)

As indicated previously, the yield on short-term marketable
government issues would have had to exceed the one year
yield on new issues of E bonds by more than +0.50 percentage
points in order to obtain negative annual net sales of group
I bonds (19 times out of 20).

Estimates of the Demand for Group II Bonds
The simple regressions for annual net sales with Cj^
and CR indicated that all measures of these variables were
apparent single determinants of annual net sales of group II
bonds during the postwar period.

The multiple determinant

regressions undertaken indicated that a few of the other

7
Annual net sales are in millions of dollars; Cj^
per cent (two decimals).

, in
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proxy independent variables could significantly aid either
C & 2 or 0 ^ 2 and
net sales.

accounting for the fluctuations in

With

and

independent variables, C ^ ,

as
Cj^^,

cantly correlated with net sales.

and second
DI, and Cgj^ were signifi
The other measures of the

income variable (DI/p, PS, and PS/p) and those of the additional income variable (GFS, NAS, CDG, and CDE/p) were not
significant.

This estimate of net sales for group II bonds,

which has a standard error of the estimate of $513 (mil
lions) , is summarized in equation (5-5).

Annual net sales, 1947-63 • -44,601 +
4,832.9 CR2 + 6,908.2 C

^

+

39,469.5 DI - 2,302.1 C g ^

.8

(5-5)

Only the positive relationship between net sales and
C^w

is inconsistent with the (anticipated) results pre-

21
viously obtained from the simple regression analysis.
Tables 5-1 and 5-4.)

(See

A lack of independence between the

three proxy variables for the price of savings bonds may
have contributed greatly to this inconsistency.

Q

Annual net sales are measured in millions of dollars;
cR2» cNM21» an(* CSD 2 >
Per cetlt (two decimals); and DI is
measured as a fraction (four decimals).
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TABLE 5-4.--Total Coefficients of Determination (R ) ,
Total Coefficients of Correlation (R), and Partial
Coefficients of Correlation (r) for Equations (5-5)
and (5-6)

Independent variable
added

R2

R

r

Equation (5-5):
Cr2
c n m 21

DI
csd2

+0.565

+0.752

+0.752

+0.847

+0.920

+0.805

+0.908

+0.953

+0.680

+0.938

-0.968

-0.572

+0.565

+0.752

+0.752

+0.686

+0.828

+0.526

Equation (5-6):

Cp

2

CSD2

As indicated in Table 5-4, Cj^ alone accounts for 56.5
per cent of the total variations in annual net sales during
the postwar period.

The addition of

as

second

independent variable significantly aids CR ^ by accounting
for 64.9 per cent of the fluctuations in net sales that were
not accounted for (43.5 per cent) by C r ^ alone.

The addi

tion of real income (DI) as the third independent variable
significantly aids CR ^ and Cjn^i ^y accounting for 46.3
per cent of the variations in net sales not accounted for
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(15.3 per cent) by both CR ^

^NM 2 ^'

^SD 2 * as t*ie f°urt*1

independent variable, significantly aids Cj^,

an<* D *

by accounting for 32.7 per cent of the variations unac
counted for (9.2 per cent) in annual net sales by the combi
nation of CR z ,

and DI.

When the average values of Cj^,

D l * and CSD 2

during the postwar period--0.646, 0.419, 1.00016, and
0.716, respectively--are substituted in equation (5-5),
annual net sales of group II bonds are calculated to be
-$949 (million), as shown in Table 5-5.

Perhaps equation

(5-5) may also be used to indicate the greater importance
of interest rate differentials as compared to income in the
demand for group II bonds.
For example, the increases and the decreases in C ^ *
cN M 2i* D I » and CSD 2 ^or eac*1 consecutive year during the
postwar period were calculated as well as the averages of
both the increases and the decreases for each of these
variables.

The average value of the six increases (ten

decreases) for CR ^ is 0.402 (-0.485); for

ten i*1*

creases (six decreases) average 0.229 (-0.128); for DI,
nine increases (seven decreases) average 0.01470 (-0.01286);
and for CgD2 » eleven increases (five decreases) average
0.133 (-0.130).

Furthermore, in only two of the sixteen

years did all four variables change in the same direction.
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TABLE 5-5.--Calculations of Annuo1 Not Solos ond « Chango In
Annual Not Sales of Group 11 Bonds for Soloctod Valuos of
cR2» cNM 2i’ DI* And CS02» o£ Average Pries Elasticities
for C« , Cum-., and CsDoi *nd of Avorago IncosM Elasticity
for DI
“
*

Item, for
aquation (5-5)
Intercept

Chango in
Annual
annual
not
salos
not salos
(Millions of dollars)
-44,601

—

Coofflciont of
elasticities
(Price or
lncoteo)
—

Substituted CR ,
value:
40.646 (average)

2,929

-0.887 /-0.485 0.402/

—

-4.287
2.92$
-0.887
0.643

- 1.07

-4,287

Substituted
C ji^^ i value:
2.467
40.419 (average)

2,895
1 -o c

40.357 /0.229 (-0.12817

0.419
2,467

Substituted DI
value:
41.00016 (average)

1,301
39.476 - 0 . 1 0
0.3^960
1,00016

39,476

40.32960 10.01470
- (-0.0128617

1,301

Substituted CSD
value:
2
40.716 (average)

-1,648

40.263 /"0.133 (-0.13017
TOTAL

-605
-17348
0.263
-605

-949

-1,124

- 1.00
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For the other fourteen observations,

and

inversely related in each case, but DI and

were
changed in

the same direction six times and in opposite directions five
times.
in

For the entire postwar period, therefore, a change
*-n t*le opposite direction to that for

CgD 2 was most common.

DI, and

Now that these preliminary calcula-

tions have been made, they can be substituted into equation
(5-5) in order to show the greater importance of interest
rate differentials versus income in the demand for group II
bonds.

As shown in Table 5-5, a change in annual net sales

is calculated by substituting into equation (5-5) the dif
ferences between the average of the decreases (increases)
and the average of the increases (decreases) for
(CnM2 i * D* ’ aru* ^SD 2 ^*

total absolute change in annual

net sales of group II bonds is influenced less by the change
in income than by any of the changes in the interest rate
differentials, except for the change in

All of the

price elasticities, however, are numerically larger than
the income elasticity.
When

(See Table 5-5.)

was substituted for

*-n

multiple

22

determinant analysis, it was significant in accounting for
the variations in net sales only as a single independent
variable.

That is,

determinant of net sales.

was significant only as a single
None of the other variables--
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C r 2 , CSD^ ( the various income measures and the various
additional income measures--could significantly aid
as the first independent variable, in accounting for the
fluctuations in net sales.
Without a

as t*ie 8econ<^ Independent variable,

however, only C r 2 and Cgu2 were significant multiple deter
minants of net sales.

This relationship is shown in equa

tion (5-6) and has a standard error of the estimate of $1,070
(millions).

Annual net sales, 1947-63 « -4,105 +
1,930.1 CR2 + 2,812.3 C g ^ . 9

(5-6)

The indicated positive relationship between net sales
and CgQ^ is inconsistent with the anticipated inverse re
lationship, which was confirmed in equation (5-5).

This

inconsistency, which is apparently similar to that exhibited
by ^NM2^

e9uati°n (5-5), may also be the result of a lack

of independence between the price concepts for savings bonds
(discussed later).

As shown in Table 5-4, the addition of

Csd2 as t*le second independent variable significantly aids
Cj^2 by accounting for 27.7 per cent of the fluctuations in

9

Annual net sales are
C^2 and Cgj)2 »
Per cent
The difference in the
and (5-6) can be explained

measured in millions of dollars;
(two decimals).
intercepts for equations (5-5)
primarily by the inclusion and
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net sales that were not accounted for (43.3 per cent) by
C„

alone.

2
Disregarding the unexpected relationship between net
sales and the second Independent variable in both estimates
of net sales /equations (5-5) and (5-6/7,

aPPears to

be a better second determinant than Cgj^*

For example, as

the second independent variable, cn H 2 ^ accounts f°r 64.9
per cent of the variations left unaccounted for (43.5 per
cent) by

^SD 2 accounts f°r only 27.7 per cent.

Similarly, the estimate of net sales summarized by equation
(5-5) is preferred to that indicated by equation (5-6).
That is, with a standard error of $513 (millions), equation
(5-5) accounts for 93.8 per cent of the total variations in
net sales; with a larger standard error of $1,070 (millions),
equation (5-6) accounts for only 68.6 per cent.

(See Table

5-4.)

A Digression on the Grouping of Savings Bonds
The striking differences between the estimates of the
demand for group II bonds /equations (5-5) and (5-6/7 and
and the best estimate of the demand for group 1 bonds

omission of the income variable (DI).
For example, if the
average value of DI during the postwar period is substituted
into equation (5-5), its intercept is increased from -44,601
to -5,124.

/equation ( 5 - 4 apparently confirm the premise that the
grouping of savings bonds according to similar character
istics is valid, even though no estimate of the demand for
all savings bonds is available for comparison.

Whether the

grouping of savings bonds utilized is better than any other
type of grouping is unanswerable.

It has been pointed out,

however, that the bonds within each group are not completely
homogeneous with respect to denominations and type (discountappreciation or current-income).

It is possible that some

unknown part of the differences between the estimates of
demand for the two groups might be attributed to the lack of
homogeneity of type among bonds within a group.

However, the

lack of homogeneity with respect to denomination appears more
significant.

In fact, the lack of homogeneity among bonds

within group I with respect to denomination may explain most
of the differences between the estimates of demand for the
two groups.
During the postwar period, savings bonds were sold in
a wide variety of denominations.

However, as indicated pre

viously, a bond-denomination-range parameter emerges from
separate analysis of groups I and II bonds; this range was
perhaps $25 to $1,000 for group I and $500 or more for
group II.

Since decisions to purchase and redeem savings

bonds are likely to be made on a more rational basis the

136

higher the denomination of the security, the greater homo
geneity among group II bonds with respect to the bonddenomination-range undoubtedly contributed greatly to the
better estimates for this group.
If this is correct, series H bonds, which possess a
minimum denomination of $500, could possibly have been
placed into group II instead of group I.

In this case,

series E bonds would have stood alone, with all of the
other savings bonds placed in a second group.

It seems

reasonable to expect that the estimates of the demand for
this new group II would be at least as good as, and per
haps slightly better than, those actually obtained for
group II in this study.

Since the sale of J and K bonds

was discounted early in 1957, net sales of group II bonds
after this date were necessarily negative as only redemp
tions could take place.

If group II had consisted of series

H bonds, too, its net sales function would have been more
uniform in that the combined effects of gross sales and
redemptions would have been measured throughout, rather than
during only a part of the postwar period.

For this reason,

the estimates of demand for a group II which included series
H bonds would perhaps be slightly better than those actually
obtained for group II in this study. On the other hand, the
estimates of the demand for series E bonds--in comparison
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to those actually obtained for group I--might well have
been inferior.

In comparison to group I, of course, series

E bonds would have had a narrower bond-denomination-range.
While a narrower range would have contributed to greater
homogeneity with respect to denomination, the degree to
which decisions to purchase and redeem savings bonds are
likely to have been made on a more rational basis would
have been reduced.

Therefore, it is possible that greater

homogeneity, but fewer rational decisions, could lead to
estimates of the demand for E bonds which would be in
ferior to those actually obtained for group I.

Thus, there

appears to be little to gain in the overall results by
placing series H bonds in group II rather than In group I.
If this analysis is correct, future empirical studies
of the demand for savings bonds may provide better overall
results than this study did if three groups of bonds--E
bonds in denominations of $200 or less, E and H bonds in
denominations of $500 or less, and group II bo n d s ^ - - a r e
analyzed.

Currently, however, annual net sales of E bonds

During the postwar period, no savings bonds with
denominations in excess of $200 but less than $500 were sold.
Nevertheless, in his study, George Hanc indicated that group
I (series E and H bonds) might be subdivided or subclassi
fied on the basis of denominations of $100 or less and
denominations of $200 or more.
See George Hanc, o£. c i t . ,
p. 55.
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in denominations of $200 or less or
$500 or more are not available.

denominations of

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Ten series of savings bonds have been sold since Che
inception of the program in 1935.

All savings bonds were

similar in that they were registered and nonmarketable,
thus providing purchasers virtually riskless investments.
Although all savings bonds were highly liquid and interest
yielding, those series of bonds designed primarily for
individuals with small financial resources were more at
tractive with respect to these features.

After several

years of difficulty with bonds designed to appeal to non
individual investors with large financial resources, the
sale of these series was discontinued.
The encouragement of individual thrift and the pro
motion of a widespread distribution of the ownership of
the public debt were two primary objectives of the pro
gram from its inception through 1963.

During the Second

World War, and thereafter, minimizing the Treasury's
"residual" borrowing from the commercial banking system
became an additional and highly important objective of the
program.

Indeed, the characteristics of savings bonds

and the continuing objectives of the program indicate
139
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that the Treasury relied upon the sale of savings bonds
primarily as a means of borrowing directly from indivi
duals , perhaps especially from individuals with small
financial resources.

The Role of Savings Bonds in Treasury Borrowing
In borrowing directly from individuals, the Treasury
placed itself in competition with the financial inter
mediaries.

Furthermore, it depended upon the intermedi

aries in selling the savings bonds, except to the extent
that it introduced the payroll savings plan to tap funds
from individuals with small financial resources.

Particu

larly in regards to the payroll savings plan, the Treasury
may have succeeded in widening the distribution of the
ownership of the public debt.
Registered and nonmarketable savings bonds were per
haps essential in promoting a widespread distribution of
the ownership of the public debt and in borrowing directly
from individuals.

However, since savings bonds were also

made redeemable for cash virtually at any time with little
or no notice, they were highly liquid assets.

Initial

success in promoting a widespread distribution of the
ownership of highly liquid public debt, therefore, depended
upon the willingness and/or the ability of the Treasury to
adopt an attractive fixed yield structure for savings bonds.
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Continuing success of the program, on the other hand, de
pended upon the willingness and/or the ability of the
Treasury to maintain--in spite of a fixed yield structure
for savings bonds--the attractiveness of yields for savings
bonds in comparison to alternative assets.
In an environment in which interest rates are rela
tively stable, a fixed yield structure on savings bonds
might enable the Treasury to both attract a large number
of long-term lenders and inhibit redemptions of outstanding
bonds prior to maturity, but the cost to the Treasury could
be quite high.

The reason for this, of course, is that

the Treasury must fix the yield structure on its savings
bonds sufficiently high to insure the attractiveness of
these securities vis-a-vis competing outlets for funds.
In general, the Treasury cannot ignore its financing costs
and is under pressure to minimize them.

Even worse, when

economic conditions are relatively unstable, frequent
changes in yields on savings bonds are required if the
Treasury is to attract long-term lenders and inhibit early
redemptions.

Yet, the frequency of changes in yields on

nonmarketable issues are clearly limited by institutional
restraints.
Frequent changes in yield structures for savings bonds
were unnecessary from the inception of the program to the
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end of Che first phase of Che postwar period (1950).

In

fact, during this period only one change in yield structure
was made--when E bonds were substituted for D bonds early
in 1941.

Within the environment of generally stable and

low yields on alternative investments, the prevailing yield
structures provided a "premium" in maturity yield and a
"penalty" for early redemption and allowed the Treasury to
expand the role of savings bonds in its borrowing.

Thus,

the program became an important source of cash receipts for
the Treasury.
In particular, it provided $3,489 million of net cash
receipts during the period of origin (March 1, 1935 to April
30, 1941); $44,529 million during the expansionary period
(May 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946); and $4,685 million dur
ing the first phase of the postwar period (calendar years
1947-50).

In spite of increased liquidations, which began

towards the end of the Second World War, cash receipts
from the program also contributed to the achievement of the
debt management objective of retiring marketable debt be
tween February,

1946 and mid-1949.

By the end of 1950,

therefore, the role of savings bonds in Treasury borrowing
reached its summit when outstanding savings bonds of $58,019
million represented 22.6 per cent of the national debt.
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After the accord, the economic environment changed to
one of generally rising, but flexible yields on alternative
Investments.

In response to these developments, the Treasury

raised the structure of yields on certain series of savings
bonds on three occasions--1952, 1957, and 1959.

These

boosts, however, were not of a sufficient magnitude and
reflected the Inability and/or unwillingness of the Treasury
to adapt sufficiently to the changing conditions.

In spite

of these changes in yields, the savings bond program re
sulted in annual net cash drains for the Treasury from the
accord to the end of 1963.

Outstanding savings bonds de

clined to $48,827 million by the end of that year, and the
Treasury experienced a cumulative net cash drain of $25,602
million from 1951 to 1963.

As a percentage of the national

debt, holdings of savings bonds declined (from 22.6 per
cent) to 15.8 per cent.

Not only was this lack of success

significant in itself, but undoubtedly broader monetary and
debt management policies were adversely affected by these
developments in the savings bond program.
In an attempt to explain the decline in the net sales
of savings bonds during calendar years 1947-63, the demand
for these bonds, by groups, was analyzed.

A comparison of

the estimates of annual net sales for the two groups
/equations (5-4),

(5-5), and (5-6^7 provides some meaningful
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Insights into the factors determining the postwar demand
for savings bonds.

For example, the estimates point out

the greater sensitivity of group II bondholders
In interest rates.

to changes

The better estimates of annual net

sales for group II bonds also suggest that group I bond
holders may be influenced more by non-economic factors, such
as advertisements appealing to patriotism.
Nevertheless, neither the multiple determinant esti
mates of the demand for group II bonds nor the best single
determinant estimate of the demand for group I bonds is
completely satisfactory.

In fact, both leave a great deal

of the causal forces unexplained.

It apppars that the

biggest shortcomings of this attempt to explain the demand
for savings bonds stem from the lack of independent price
determinants for net sales and an adequate approximation of
the income determinant for savings bonds.
The choice of net sales as the dependent variable was
a necessary evil, however.

Independent price concepts for

gross sales and redemptions could not be defined.

On the

other hand, single (composite) proxy prices for a net sales
demand function could not be calculated since the problem of
assessing relative weights to reasonably independent price
concepts defined for gross sales and redemptions could not
be resolved.

Therefore, a net sales demand function was
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adopted, and price concepts defined for gross sales and
redemptions were considered as possible proxies for the
price of savings bonds.

That Is, C ^ ,

CR , and CgD were

considered possible proxies for the price of savings bonds
in the multiple determinant analysis of net sales.
For group I bonds during the postwar period, this ap
proach was most unsatisfactory empirically--only
found to be a single determinant of net sales.
all three measures of

was
Although

were significantly correlated

with net sales at the 95 per cent level of confidence, even
the best single determinant estimator of net sales
did not provide sufficient evidence to classify group I
bondholders as short-term lenders.

The classification of

these bondholders on the basis of the best estimator among
the single Cj^

measures appears highly precarious, since

the best estimator among the single

measures was not

also found to be a significant multiple determinant of the
net sales of group 11 bonds.
In treating

CR , Cj^, and CgD as possible determinants

of net sales for group II bonds, on the other hand, the
results of the estimates of demand were more satisfactory.
However, in both estimates of net sales /equations (5-5) and
(5-627, the relationship between net sales and the second
independent price (either

or ^SD ^ was i-ncons*-stent
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with the anticipated relationship, which had been confirmed
by the simple regression analysis.

Of course, both of these

price concepts were developed from the purchasers1 point of
view, whereas the first independent price (Cr^) was developed
from the redeemers' point of view.

To the extent that these

two viewpoints did not provide independent price measures,
the use of

C

r

,

Cp^, and Cgj) as reasonably independent price

concepts for net sales undoubtedly contributed greatly to
the inconsistent result for the second independent determi
nant in each estimate of net sales.
If this inconsistency can be disregarded, the better
estimate of net sales for group II bonds is summarized by
equation (5-5).1

Since

CR 2 and CSD2 were signifi

cant multiple determinants of net sales, group II bond
holders could be classified as intermediate- or long-term
lenders who are responsive to changes in opportunity costs
as measured by interest rate differentials.

The greater

sensitivity of these bondholders to interest rate differen
tials undoubtedly justifies the Treasury's rationale in
discontinuing the sale of J and K bonds early in 1957.

^■If this inconsistency is not disregarded, the best
estimate of net sales for group II bonds must be selected
from the significant single determinants--either C n m 21»
C n M 2 2 » or Cr 2 - ®ee Tflble 5-2.
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Of the five multiple determinants originally proposed
for the demand function, it was anticipated that both the
income determinant and the additional income variable would
not be significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence.
In fact, the additional income variable was proposed because
a single income determinant was considered inadequate.

Even

with the additional income variable, both measures appeared
to be inferior approximations of the income determinant.
Perhaps a major reason for this is that the secular trend
within each measure had to be eliminated in order to avoid
spurious correlation.
Surprisingly, however, one measure of the income deter
minant (DI) was significantly correlated with the net sales
of group II bonds in the multiple determinant analysis.
Since DI is real disposable income in each year expressed
as a proportion of its secular trend value, the economic
significance of this measure of the income determinant in
equation (5-5) is not clear, at least to the writer.

There

fore, the reliance that should be placed on the absolute
size of the calculated income coefficient of elasticity
(Table 5-5) is also somewhat nebulous.

Nevertheless, the

fact that the price elasticities of demand were ten times
larger than the income coefficient of elasticity appears
to be significant.

That is, interest rate differentials
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were more important than income as a determinant of demand.
For group I bonds also, greater importance of interest rate
differentials in comparison to income is perhaps indicated
by the significance of every measure of Cj^
nant of net sales.

as a determi-

A visual study of the fluctuations in

redemptions of E bonds (by denomination within a year from
their date of purchase) appears to indicate that changes in
interest rates may be more helpful in explaining the fluctu
ations in redemptions than income.

Due to the dominance of

E bonds in group I, the redemption data of E bonds may be
used to imply a greater importance of interest rate differ
entials in comparison to income for group I bonds also.
In summary, this preliminary study of the demand for
savings bonds by groups during the postwar period appears
to have its greatest value in providing insights into the
formulation of further studies.

Until the data become

available to allow the inclusion of a bond denomination
variable, however,

it would seem that the minor changes

that could be made in the grouping of bonds probably would
not provide any significant improvements in the overall re
sults.

If price concepts for gross sales and redemptions

could be measured so that more independence existed between
them, gross sales and redemptions, rather than net sales,
could be considered as the dependent variables.

In order to
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avoid the need to construct composite prices, which would
combine independent price concepts for gross sales and re
demptions into appropriate proxies for net sales, estimates
of demand might be improved by taking the difference between
a gross sales function and a redemptions function.
thermore,

Fur

it might be useful in future studies to exclude

the period of time between the end of the Second World War
and the Accord and to concentrate on the period following
the return to "free" financial markets in 1951.

With a

shorter time period, perhaps quarterly, rather than annual,
data might be used; however, some difficulty might be ex
perienced in obtaining quarterly data for the returns paid
to shareholders or depositors by financial intermediaries.
Yet, this preliminary study does provide some empirical
guidelines in estimating the demand for savings bonds during
the postwar period.

For group I bonds, all three estimates

of annual net sales with
5-2.)

could be used.

(See Table

However, with a standard error of $463 (million),

equation (5-5) summarizes the best estimate of demand.
Since

measures the differential between the average

return on short-term (9-12 months) marketable government
securities and the yield on new issues of E bonds held for
a time-holding-period of one year, negative annual net
sales of group I bonds can be expected (19 times out of 20)
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when this yield differential exceeds 0.50 percentage points.
At this time, of course, the better estimates of net sales
for group II bonds are of historical importance only, since
the sale of J and K bonds was discontinued early in 1957.
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APPENDIX A

TABLE A - 1.--Original Schedules of Redemption Values of
$100 Maturity Value Savings Bonds for Series A-D,
E, F, and G Bonds
(Values during each half-year period after the issue
date in dollars)

Period after
issue date
/Year(s/7

First 1/2
1/2 - 1
1-11/2
11/2-2
2 - 2 1/2
2 1/2-3
3 - 3 1/2
3 1/2-4
4 - 4 1/2
4 1/2-5
5 - 5 1/2
5 1/2-6
6 - 6 1/2
6 1/2-7
7 - 7 1/2
7 1/2-8
8 - 8 1/2
8 1/2-9
9 - 9 1/2
9 1/2 - 10
Maturity (10)
10 - 10 1/2
10 1/2 - 11
11 - 11 1/2
11 1/2 - 12
Maturity (12)

Series
A-D

Series E
(1941)

75
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
90
92
94
96
98
100

75.00
75.00
75.50
76.00
76.50
77.00
78.00
79.00
80.00
81.00
82.00
83.00
84.00
86.00
88.00
90.00
92.00
94.00
96.00
98.00
100.00

-------

-------

-------

-------

-------

-------

-------

-------

»

—

—

Series F
(1941)

»

w

Series G
(1941)

»

•

w

74.00
74.20
74. 50
74.90
75.40
76.00
76.70
77.60
78.60
79. 70
80.90
82. 20
83. 50
84.80
86.10
87.40
88.70
90.00
91.40

98.80
97.80
96.90
96.20
95.60
95.10
94.80
94.70
94. 70
94.90
95.20
95. 50
95.80
96.10
96.40
96.70
97.00
97. 30
97.60

---

---

92.90
94. 50
96.20
98.00
100.00

97.90
98.20
98.60
99.20
100.00

Source:
Series A-D bond data from U. S . , Annual Report
of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the F i 
nances for Fiscal Year Ended 1940, p. 61; for E - 1941
bonds, ibid, , 1941, p. 308; for F - 1941 bonds, ibid., p.
313; for G - bonds, ibid., p. 314.
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TABLE A - 2.--Original Schedules of Yields Realized on
$100 Maturity Value Savings Bonds for Series A-D,
E, F, and G Bonds
(Realized yields to the beginning of the half-year
periods in per cent)

Period after
issue date
/Year(s)J

First 1/2
1/2 - 1
1-11/2
11/2-2
2 - 2 1/2
2 1/2-3
3 - 3 1/2
3 1/2-4
4 - 4 1/2
4 1/2-5
5 - 5 1/2
5 1/2-6
6 - 6 1/2
6 1/2-7
7 - 7 1/2
7 1/2-8
8 - 8 1/2
8 1/2-9
9 - 9 1/2
9 1/2 - 10
Maturity (10)
10 - 10 1/2
10 1/2 - 11
11 - 11 1/2
11 1/2 - 12
Maturity (12)

Source:

Series
A-D

Series E
(1941)

Series F
(1941)

Series G
(1941)

tm •

0.00
1.33
1. 76
1.97
2.09
2.16
2.21
2. 24
2.26
2.28
2.29
2. 29
2.30
2.30
2.45
2.57
2.67
2.76
2.84
2.90
--

0.00
0.67
0.88
0.99
1.06
1.31
1.49
1.62
1.72
1.79
1.85
1.90
2.12
2.30
2.45
2.57
2.67
2.76
2.84
2.90

- - -

—

- -

mm w

• *

—

•*

Same as Table A-l.

0.00
0.27
0.45
0.61
0. 75
0.89
1.03
1.19
1.34
1.49
1.63
1.76
1.87
1.96
2.03
2.09
2. 14
2.19
2.24
-

0. 10
0.30
0.44
0.61
0.75
0.88
1.04
1.20
1.35
1. 51
1.66
1.79
1.89
1.98
2.05
2.12
2.18
2. 23
2. 27

-

2. 29
2.34
2.40
2.46
2. 53

2. 31
2.35
2.39
2.44
2. 50
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TABLE A - 3.-- Original Schedules of Prospective Yields to
Maturity on Savings Bonds not Redeemed prior to
Maturity for Series A-D, E, F, and G Bonds
(Prospective yields from the beginning of the halfyear periods to maturity in per cent)

Period after
issue date
/Year( s2 7
First 1/2
1/2 - 1
1-11/2
11/2-2
2 - 2 1/2
2 1/2-3
3 - 3 1/2
3 1/2 - 4
4 - 4 1/2
4 1/2-5
5 - 5 1/2
5 1/2-6
6 - 6 1/2
6 1/2-7
7 - 7 1/2
7 1/2-8
8 - 8 1/2
8 1/2-9
9 - 9 1/2
9 1/2 - 10
Maturity (10)
10 - 10 1/2
10 1/2 - 11
11 - 11 1/2
11 1/2 - 12
Maturity (12)

Source:

Series
A-D

Series E
(1941)

Series F
(1941)

Series G
(1941)

2.90
3.05
3.07
3.10
3.13
3. 17
3.21
3.27
3.34
3.42
3.52
3.64
3.81
4.02
4. 31
4.26
4.21
4. 17
4. 12
4.08

2.90
3.05
3.15
3.25
3.38
3.52
3.58
3.66
3.75
3.87
4.01
4.18
4.41
4.36
4.31
4.26
4.21
4.17
4. 12
4.08

2.53
2.64
2.73
2.82
2.91
2.99
3.07
3. 15
3.20
3.24
3.27
3.29
3.29
3.31
3.32
3.35
3.40
3.46
3.54
3.63

2.50
2.62
2.73
2.84
2.94
3.04
3.13
3.20
3.26
3.30
3.32
3.33
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.37
3. 39
3.42
3.42
3.51

—

—

—

- -

—

* “

*“

Same as Table A-l.

- -

3. 72
3.81
3.91
4.08
—•

3.60
3. 75
3.94
4.13
— —

TABLE A-4.--Average Yields on Marketable Government Securities and Average Yields
Earned on Shares or Deposits in Insured, Private Financial Intermediaries, by
Calendar Years, 1934-41
(Yields in per cent)

Government obliga tions
Calendar
year

Bills^1^
(New
issues)

Private financial institutions

Notes
(3-5 yrs.)
Tax-exempt

Bonds^
Partially
Tax-exempt

Savings &
loan
shares

Mutual
savings
deposits

Commer
cial bank
deposits

1934

0.256

2.12

3.12

4.07

2.57

2.40

1935

0.137

1. 29

2.79

3.93

2.26

2.01

1936

0.143

1.11

2.69

3.84

1.96

1.72

1937

0.447

1.40

2.74

3.84

1.92

1.62

1938

0.053

0.83

2.61

3.81

1.91

1.55

1939

0.023

0.59

2.41

3.78

1.88

1.43

1940

0.014

0.50

2.26

3.63

1.73

1.30

1941

0.103

0.46

2.05

3.56

1.66

1.20

TABLE A-4 (cont.)
Source: Average yields on government obligations from Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve Bulletin, XXXI (May, 1945), 483; average yields earned on shares
in insured savings and loan associations from Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the
United States (Princeton, N. J., 1955), Vol. 1, p. 447; average yields earned on
deposits in insured mutual savings banks for 1934, U. S., Annual Report of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for Year Ending December 31. 1934, p* 243
and for years 1935-41, ibid. 1941. p. 59; average yields earned on time and sav
ings deposits in insured commercial banks, ibid. 1942, p. 38.
(1) Tax-exempt prior to March 1, 1941 and including the following
maturities:
three months, to February 16, 1934; six months, from February 23,
1934 to February 23, 1935; nine months, from March 1, 1935 to October 15, 1937;
bills maturing about March 16, 1938 from October 22 to December 10, 1937; three
months, from December 17, 1937 to date.
(2) Average of yields on all outstanding, partially tax-exempt government
bonds due or callable after twelve years for 1934; and after 15 years, from 1935
to date.
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CHART A-l.--Yields on Bonds, by Time-holding-period and Issue

E-1952 •

Per
cent
5

E-1941
E-1959

4.0
5
•H

F-1941
„

E-1957
3.0

A-D

...

r^J-1952

5

4.0
E-1959
•' E-1957
/ E-1952

;

0

J-1952

•H

T3

a>

2.0

N
H

Q
<u

F-1941

04

1.0

1

3

1 3 5 7
5 7 9
Time-holding-period (years)

9

11

Source:
Realized and prospective yields on all savings
bonds except E-1959 are from Treasury Bulletin (May, 1957),
pp. A-8 and A-9; for E-1959, ibid. (October, 1959), p. A-4.
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TABLE B-l.--Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of Group I Bonds, by Calendar
Years, 1941-63
(Millions of dollars)

Gross sales V
Calendar

(Issue price) 4/

year

Yearly

Cumulative

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946

1,145
5,989
10,344
12,380
9,822
4,466

1,145
7,134
17,478
29,858
39,680
44,146

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

4,085
4,224
4,208
3,668
3,190
3,575
4,368
4,889
5,368

48,231
52,445
56,663
60,331
63,521
67,096
71,464
76,353
81,721

Redemptions 2/
(Issue price plus
accrued discount)

kj

Proportions of
reaempt:ions to
gross £sales
(Pei cent)_
Yearly Cumulative

Cumulative

Net sales

11
209
1,380
3,005
4,963
5,423

11
220
1,600
4,605
9,568
14,991

1,134
5,780
8,964
9,375
4,859
-947

1
3
13
24
51
121

1
3
9
15
24
34

3,930
3,728
3,448
3,912
4,036
4,098
4,157
4,444
4,652

18,921
22,649
26,097
30,009
34,045
38,143
42,300
46,744
51,396

155
496
760
-244
-846
-523
211
445
716

96
88
82
107
127
115
95
91
87

39
43
46
50
54
57
59
61
63

Yearly

TABLE B-l (coat.)

Gross sales
Calendar
year

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1947-50
1951-63
1947-63

(Issue price) 4/
Yearly Cumulative

5,043
4,507
4,689
4,320
4,350
4,539
4,278
4,760

86,764
91,271
95,960
100,280
104,630
109,169
113,447
118,207

Redemptions 2/ 3/
(Issue price plus
accrued discount) 4/
Yearly Cumulative

Net sales

Proportions of
redemptions to
gross sales x
(Per cent)
Yearly Cumulative

4,832
5,469
4,856
5,519
4,996
4,484
4,636
4,557

56,228
61,697
66,553
72,072
77,068
81,552
86,188
90,745

216
-962
-167
-1,199
-646
55
-358
203

96
121
104
128
115
99
108
96

...

___

1,167
-2,860
-1,693

--

—

--

--

“*

——

...

...

---

—

J

--—

•

““•

—

■,

65
68
69
72
74
75
76
77

Source: Savings bond data for 1941 to 1947 from U. S., Office of the Secretary,
Treasury Bulletin (March, 1948), p. 25; data for 1948 to 1952, ibid. (December, 1953),
p. 20; data for 1953 to 1957, ibid (December, 1958), p. 38; data for 1958 to 1963,
ibid. (December, 1964), p. 65.

TABLE B-l (cont.)
Note: Net sales, cumulations and percentages are calculated from the original
data; net sales are gross sales at issue price minus redemptions at issue price plus
accrued discount.
Beginning June 1947, series E gross sales include small amounts of unclassi
fied sales consisting of series E, F, and G bonds.
1/

2/ Series E redemptions include small amounts of unclassified series A-D redemp
tions beginning October 1944 and small amounts of unclassified F and G redemptions,
beginning June 1947.
3/

4/
matured
and (2)
exclude

Includes both matured and unmatured bonds until March 1961.
Sales and redemption figures include exchanges of minor amounts of (1)
series E bonds for series G and K bonds from May 1951 through April 1957
F and J bonds for series H bonds beginning January 1960; however, they
exchanges of series E bonds for series H bonds.

-Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of Group II Bonds, by Calendar
Years, 1941-63
(Millions of dollars)

Gross sales _1/ V
(Issue price)
Yearly

Cumulative

Redemptions 2/

3/

Proportions of
redemptions to
gross sa les
(Per c ent)

4/

(Issue price plus
accrued discount)
Yearly

Cumulative

Net sales

Yearly

Cumulative

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946

1,393
3,168
3,385
3,664
3,115
2,962

1,393
4,561
7,946
11,610
14,725
17,687

2
36
124
258
370
615

2
38
162
420
790
,1,405

1,391
3,132
3,261
3,406
2,745
2,347

1
4
7
12
21

1
2
4
5
8

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

2,609
3,071
1,626
2,406
770
586
432
1,284
907

20,296
23,367
24,993
27,399
28,169
28,755
29,187
30,471
31,378

715
840
815
905
1,093
929
1,968
2,526
2,636

2,120
2,960
3,775
4,680
5,773
6,702
8,670
11,196
13,832

1,894
2,231
811
1,501
-323
-343
-1,536
-1,242
-1,729

27
27
50
38
142
158
456
197
291

10
13
15
17
20
23
30
37
44
O'

TABLE B-2 (cont. )

Gross sales 1/ 4/

Calendar
year

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1947-50
1951-63
1947-63

(Issue price)
Yearly

475
98
---------------

—

—

—

—

—

_

_

—

Redemptions 2/

Yearly

31,853
31,951
31,951
31,951
31,951
31,951
31,951
31,951

3,422
4,153
2,395

— —

—

.

.

———

— —

—

Cumulative

17,254
21,407
23,802
L27,048
3 >2A6c I*
1,7325/6 1 28,780
1,1086/71 29,888
9 6 3 1 5 30,851
4 6 2 - ^ 31,313

---------------

.

4/

Proportions of
redemptions to
gross sales
(Per cent)

(Issue price plus
accrued discount)

Cumulative

_

31

™ —

*

— -

.

.

.

Net sales

-2,947
-4,055
-2,395
-3,246
-1,732
-1,108
-963
-462
6,437
-22,081
-15,644

Yearly Cumulative

720
■*

---

-

Mi *

-•

^

*

-

»

tm

**

54
67
74
85
90
94
97
98
—
-*™

Source: Savings bond data for 1941 to 1947 from Treasury Bulletin (March, 1948),
p. 26; data for 1948 to 1952, ibid. (December, 1953), p. 20; data for 1953 to 1957,
ibid. (December, 1958), p. 38; data for 1958 to 1963, ibid. (December, 1964), p. 65.

TABLE B-2 (cont.)
Note: Net sales, cumulations and percentages are calculated from the original
data; net sales are gross sales at issue price minus redemptions at issue price plus
accrued discount.
1/ Beginning June 1947, group II gross sales do not include small amounts of
unclassified sales consisting of series E, F and G bonds.
2 / Beginning June 1947, group II redemptions do not include small amounts of
unclassified F and G redemptions.

3/ Includes both matured and unmatured bonds until March 1961.
4/ Sales and redemption figures include exchanges of minor amounts of (1)
matured series E
bonds for series G and K bondsfrom May 1951 through April 1957
and
(2) series F
and J bonds for series H bondsbeginning January, 1960.
5/ Includes
notes of 1964.
6/

exchanges of series 1948 F andG bonds for 4-3/4 % marketable

Includes exchanges of series 1949 F and G bonds for 4

%

marketable bonds

of 1969.
Includes exchanges of series 1950 F and G bonds for 3-7/8 % marketable
bonds of 1968.
]_f

Includes exchanges of series 1951 and 1952 F and G bonds for 3-7/8 %
marketable bonds of 1971 and 4 % of marketable bonds 1980.
&/
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A SINGLE PRICE DETERMINANT ESTIMATE OF
GROSS SALES OF GROUPS I AND II BONDS
With annual gross sales rather than net sales as the
dependent variable, the Cjjjj regressions were repeated in
order to determine whether C._, was a determinant of gross
NM

sales of group

I bonds during the entire postwar period and

of group II bonds during calendar years 1947-56.
For group I bonds, the anticipated inverse relation
ship between gross sales and each

was confirmed in all

cases but one--gross sales with

Surprisingly, per

haps, no C n M jj was significant.

With

c n m 12’

and

^NM^ 3 » resPe c tively, the simple coefficients of correlation
are -0.214, +0.214, and -0.177.
The anticipated inverse relationship between gross
sales of group II bonds and each

was confirmed also.

Furthermore, unlike the results of the regressions for group
I bonds,

an<* ^NM22 were

significant. The results

of these tests are summarized in Table C-l.
tionship between gross sales and

For

the rela

which was not found

to be significant, the simple coefficient of correlation is
-0.206.
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TABLE C-l.--Significant Regression Equations, Coefficients
of Correlation and Standard Errors of Estimate for Group
II Bonds, Calendar Years 1947-56

Regression Equations

Coefficient
of
correlation
(R)

Standard error of
estimate (sg)
(Millions of
dollars)

Annual gross sales,
1947-56(1* - 152 1,181.5 Cpjj^.

-0.778

755

-0.727

702

Annual gross sales,
1947-56(1) 1,277 - 3,575.6
c n m 21*

(1) Annual gross sales are measured in millions of
dollars; CnM 2 }> in per cent (two decimals).
Cnm22 *-s
measured by tne differential between the average yield on
short-term (9-12 months) marketable government securities
and the maturity yield on new issues of series F and J
bonds.
CflM2i *-s measured by the differential between the
average yield on long-term (ten years or more) marketable
government securities and the maturity yield on new issues
of F and J bonds.
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These results are of considerable interest In that they
tend to point out the Treasury's rationale for dropping the
sale of J and K bonds early in 1957.

The greater sensitivity

to interest rate differentials among group II bondholders is
clearly indicated by the significance of the two regressions
for calendar years 1947-56.

On the other hand, no

was

significant for group I bonds during the entire postwar
period.^- Therefore,

appears to be a determinant of

gross sales for group II bonds, but not for group I bonds.
As apparent determinants of net sales, but not of gross
sales,

must be highly correlated with the redemptions

of group I bonds.

That is to say, if the fluctuations in

redemptions can be shown to have dominated those of net
sales, the significant relationships obtained for net sales
with

indicate that the measurements of Cj^ probably are

not independent of the proposed measurement of the price con
cept of Cr ^, which is based on the redeemers' point of view.
In determining whether the fluctuations in either gross
sales or redemptions dominated the fluctuations in net sales
for group I bonds, the linear secular trends of all three

^Marketable government securities, it might be noted,
might have been better alternative investments for group II
bondholders than for holders of group I bonds.
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were considered.

It appears that redemptions, rather than

gross sales, dla In fact dominate net sales during the post
war period.

The linear secular trends, of course, indicate

a negative slope for net sales, but positive slopes for gross
sales and redemptions.
It is to be recalled that

was shown to be an ap

parent determinant of net sales of group II bonds during
the entire postwar period as well as gross sales during cal
endar years 1947-56.

Because of these results, one would

suppose that gross sales should have dominated net sales.
An attempt was made to determine whether the fluctuations in
net sales were actually dominated by those of gross sales.
Prior to the accord, this appears (visually) to be the case;
since the accord, however, redemptions appear to have been
dominant.

Unlike the case of group I bonds, the dominance

question for group II bonds is somewhat indeterminate due to
the lack of uniformity in time periods.

2

2

Generally, for the postwar period, the fluctuations in
redemptions apparently had a greater influence than did
gross sales on the fluctuations in net sales; of course,
redemptions and net sales were identical after the discon
tinuance of the sales of J and K bonds early in 1957.
Quantitatively, the dominance question is somewhat in
determinate since secular trend analysis could not be used.
This approach is inapplicable since at least three time
periods would have to be analyzed--calendar years 1947-50
for the period prior to the accord; calendar years 1951-56
for the period after the accord, when both gross sales and
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These results, of course, are not entirely satisfactory.
However, the criteria used In testing the consistency of the
results--now, for net sales and gross sales with

and

then later, for net sales and redemptions with Cj^--are too
rigid If independence between the prices of savings bonds
did not exist.
shown later.

Evidence of the lack of Independence will be
So, perhaps, we are justified in continuing to

assume that Cj^ Is a determinant of net sales.

A SINGLE PRICE DETERMINANT ESTIMATE OF
REDEMPTIONS OF GROUPS I AND II BONDS
With annual redemptions of group I bonds, rather than
net sales, as the dependent variable, the anticipated in
verse relationship between

and redemptions was confirmed.

Unlike the results with net sales, Cj^ was significant in
accounting for the fluctuations in redemptions.

In fact,

a very high coefficient of correlation of -0.919 was obtained.
The significant regression obtained is summarized in equation
C-l, and its standard error of estimate is $235 (million).

redemptions took place; and calendar years 1957-63 for the
remainder of the period, when only redemptions were pos
sible.
These short time periods are not suitable for secu
lar trend analysis.
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Annual redemptions,

1947-63 ■
3

5,009 - 501.3 CRi>

(C-l)

This result, coupled with the fact that redemptions ap
pear to dominate net sales, makes the lack of significance
for the regression between annual net sales and CR ^ (see p.
118) even more surprising.

For example, since redemptions

of matured E bonds during their extended terms are included
in redemptions of group I bonds, the significance of the
regression in equation (C-l) does not indicate that the
prospective yield to maturity on new issues was an inappro
priate measure.

Nevertheless, CR ^ does not appear to be a

sufficient proxy variable for net sales in that the derived
relationship (for net sales with CR ^) was not found to be
significant according to the F test.
For group II bonds, the anticipated inverse relation
ship between CR ^ and annual redemptions was confirmed also.
With a coefficient of correlation of -0.430, however,
relationship was not significant.

the

This result is surprising

since options for extended terms were not available to these
bondholders, and the relationship between net sales and CR ^

^Annual redemptions are measured in millions of dollars;
CR ^ in per cent (two decimals).

174

was significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence.
In this case, however, the dominance of the fluctuations in
annual net sales was considered somewhat indeterminate.
(See footnote 2.)
I bonds,

Yet, in comparison with

for group

appears to be a better proxy variable for net

sales of group II bonds.
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